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THE REGULATION OF TRADING MARKETS 
Paul G. Mahoney547 & Gabriel V. Rauterberg548 
 
1 Introduction 
The U.S. equity markets have undergone profound changes in the past 15 years. The 
manual creation of contracts to buy and sell shares, either face to face on a trading floor or by 
telephone with a securities dealer, has been mostly replaced by the automated matching of buy 
and sell orders by electronic communications and information processing systems. Trading in 
listed stocks, which used to be heavily concentrated on the listing exchange, is now widely 
dispersed among multiple automated trading venues.549 Exchange specialists and over-the-
counter market makers have been eclipsed by proprietary traders that offer liquidity to the 
automated markets by executing algorithmic trading strategies. Those strategies often rely on a 
menu of new and complex order types that trading venues create to supplement the traditional 
market and limit orders.550 
Technological advances made these developments possible. The cost of creating a trading 
platform has fallen as computers replace trading floors, allowing investors, exchanges, and 
brokers to solve old problems in new ways.551  In place of market makers who manually update 
quotations to reflect information and their own inventory management needs, proprietary traders 
use automated systems to obtain market data and execute transactions pursuant to predetermined 
strategies in milliseconds or less. Rather than giving large orders to brokers who can “work” the 
                                                 
547 David and Mary Harrison Distinguished Professor of Law, University of Virginia School of 
Law. 
548 Assistant Professor of Law, University of Michigan School of Law.    
549 See U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, Concept Release on Equity Market Structure 
6 (January 14, 2010), https://www.sec.gov/rules/concept/2010/34-61358.pdf [hereinafter 
“Market Structure Release”] (NYSE’s share of trading volume in its listed stocks fell from 79% 
in 2005 to 25% in 2009). 
550 See Phil Mackintosh, Demystifying Order Types, KCG TRADING STRATEGIES & MKT. 
ANALYTICS (Sept. 2014). 
551 See James J. Angel, Lawrence E. Harris & Chester S. Spatt, Equity Trading in the 21st 
Century, 1 Q. J. OF FIN. 1 (2011). 
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order, large institutional investors split up their orders into many pieces routed to different 
trading venues. The technologies themselves and the way market participants use them differ in 
detail but not in kind from past technological breakthroughs. Throughout history, securities 
traders have been among the earliest adopters of new communications technologies, always 
seeking to profit from faster execution and access to information. 
The changes are also a product of Congress’s and the SEC’s regulatory policies.552 Both 
consider technology a tool for bringing greater competition to the securities markets. Moreover, 
each has a vision of how that competition should operate. As we will discuss in more detail 
below, Congress saw the automation of securities markets as a way to promote its longstanding 
goal of a market in which investors would trade directly with one another without the 
intermediation of an exchange specialist or market maker. For its part, the SEC encouraged a 
structure in which markets compete for trading volume in each individual stock rather than for 
listings. 
On objective measures, the current equity market structure is a great success. A retail 
investor today can trade with greater convenience and speed, and with lower commissions and 
spreads, than ever before.553  Nevertheless, numerous commentators, most notably Michael 
Lewis, argue that the new stock market is rigged against the average investor.554 The argument, 
in summary, is that exchanges and other trading centers collude with “high-frequency” 
proprietary traders to help those traders identify changes in market prices, order volumes, and 
other market information before the rest of the trading public has access to it, to the ultimate 
detriment of other investors.555 Other commentators decry the growth of so-called “dark pools,” 
                                                 
552 See Lawrence Harris, The Homogenization of U.S. Equity Trading 2 (2011), 
https://www.bankofcanada.ca/wp-content/uploads/2012/11/Larry-Harris.pdf (“decisions made by 
the SEC have effectively determined market structure for all US equities”). Harris is a former 
SEC Chief Economist. 
553 See infra Section 6. 
554 See Michael Lewis, Flash Boys: A Wall Street Revolt (2014); see also Jay Somaney, Is Our 
Stock Market Rigged?, FORBES (Aug. 24, 2015), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/jaysomaney/2015/08/24/is-our-stock-market-rigged/#731a33291b15 
(“Of late the most common question I get asked whether on the golf course or at dinner with 
friends is whether our markets are rigged?”). 
555 Yesha Yadav refers to high-frequency traders as “structural insiders” and argues that their 
trading harms other investors similarly to traditional insider trading. See Yesha Yadav, Insider 
Trading and Market Structure, 63 UCLA L. REV. 968 (2016). 
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trading platforms that do not publicly display their quotations.556 Commentators also criticize the 
fee structures that exchanges have implemented to attract order flow in a highly competitive 
market. 
It is a safe bet that neither Congress nor the SEC foresaw how technology-based 
competition would unfold in practice. The number and importance of traditional intermediaries 
has in fact declined, but they have been replaced by high-frequency and other proprietary traders, 
not by a trading environment catering exclusively to long-term investors. The SEC required the 
traditional exchanges to open up their quotations to the public, but traders still hide their trading 
interest using dark trading venues and non-displayed order types. Competition among public 
trading markets is no longer based on different methods of bringing together buyers and sellers, 
like the old competition between the NYSE and Nasdaq, but on different incentive structures for 
attracting order flow.557 The SEC appears to be having second thoughts about some aspects of 
the equity trading markets.558 
This chapter was prepared for a conference exploring the desirability and structure of a 
new special study of the securities markets.559 A companion chapter by separate authors 
addresses the financial economics literature, and we accordingly focus on the regulatory and 
legal aspects of trading markets.560 Our objective is not to resolve all of the questions that 
commentators have raised about the new equity markets, but to lay the groundwork for a new 
                                                 
556 See Scott Patterson, DARK POOLS: THE RISE OF THE MACHINE TRADERS AND THE RIGGING OF 
THE U.S. STOCK MARKET (2012); Yesha Yadav, Dark Pools and the Decline of Market 
Governance (working paper, 2017). 
557 Id. at 2. 
558 See Market Structure Release, supra note 1; U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, 
Securities Exchange Act Release No. 60997 (November 13, 2009) (hereafter “Non-Public 
Trading Interest Release”) (proposing changes to rules regulating non-exchange trading 
platforms); U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, Securities Exchange Act Release No. 
60684 (September 18, 2009) (hereafter “Flash Order Release”) (proposing rule changes to 
remove certain exemptions for orders that are canceled if not immediately executed). 
559 In 1961, Congress by joint resolution directed the SEC to “make a study and investigation of 
the adequacy, for the protection of investors, of the rules of national securities exchanges and 
national securities associations....”  See Pub. L. No. 87-196, 75 Stat. 465 (1961). The SEC 
delivered its report in 1963. See U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, Report of Special 
Study of Securities Markets, House Doc. 95, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963). 
560 Ryan Davis & Erik R. Sirri, The Economics of Trading Markets, supra.    
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special study by surveying the state of market regulation, identifying issues, and offering 
preliminary evaluations.  
Section 2 of the paper briefly describes existing trading markets and their functions. 
Sections 3, 4, and 5 survey the regulatory landscape, with Section 3 focused on the statutory 
scheme, Section 4 on the SEC’s implementing regulations, and Section 5 on the largely judge-
made regulation of fraudulent or manipulative trading. Section 6 identifies aspects of equity 
market structure that have generated criticism and merit further study. Section 7 discusses 
proposals for alternative market structures. Section 8 concludes. 
2 The U.S. Equity Markets 
A well-functioning secondary market for securities is essential to the health of the 
primary market in which businesses raise needed capital. Investors will more eagerly purchase 
shares in a company if they know they can sell the shares when desired on an efficient and low-
cost secondary market. We describe the key operational features of the trading markets for 
equities, both conceptually and as they currently exist in the United States. 
2.1 Nature and Functions 
It is tempting to think of a stock market as a facility, physical or virtual, but it is better 
described as a set of rules and procedures pursuant to which investors buy and sell securities. 
Through those rules and procedures, the market attempts to attract enough trading interest to 
provide liquidity. Liquidity implies that there is only a small trade-off between speed and price. 
In a liquid market, someone wishing to trade can find a counterparty with minimal delay and the 
resulting trade will be at a price that is attractive to both parties, meaning that it reflects a 
consensus value of the security at the time of the trade. 
A market may create the price dimension of liquidity by bringing together a sufficiently 
large and informed group of traders to offer both competition and effective price discovery. 
Alternatively, it may offer the opportunity to trade at prices derived from the primary market, 
meaning the market in which price discovery takes place. Trading markets typically attract both 
long-term investors and securities professionals who continuously gather information about 
traded companies and the trading interest of investors. Securities professionals may have a 
formal relationship with the market that imposes an obligation to quote prices or trade in order to 
provide liquidity to other traders. Alternatively, they may provide liquidity simply as a by-
product of their attempt to earn trading profits. 
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Stock markets have generated liquidity in various ways at different times and places. 
Perhaps the easiest to understand, because it is analogous to markets in many other goods, is a 
dealer market. In a dealer market, intermediaries known as market makers or dealers 
continuously quote two-way prices—a “bid” price at which they are willing to buy, and an “ask” 
or offer price at which they are willing to sell. The difference, or spread, is their compensation 
for providing liquidity through their willingness to trade. Customers wishing to buy at the market 
price contact a dealer, either directly or through a broker, and purchase at the dealer’s ask price 
or buy at its bid price. A dealer market is often referred to as “quote-driven” because the dealer’s 
posting of bid and ask prices, or quotations, initiates the transaction process. 
Virtually every dealer market throughout history, whether in grain, spices, jewels, foreign 
exchange, or any other tangible or intangible good, has attracted criticism because the dealers 
appear to make money for nothing; they neither manufacture nor improve the good being bought 
or sold. Stock markets are no different. As we will see, securities regulation is sometimes driven 
by the desire to maintain liquidity but avoid the spread. 
A floor-based exchange is a different and somewhat more complex market. It is often 
referred to as “order-driven” because the transaction process originates with a customer’s request 
to a broker to buy or sell, either at the market price (a “market” order) or a designated price (a 
“limit” order). Brokers holding buy and sell orders in a particular stock meet on the trading floor 
and participate in a two-way auction. 
If the auction results in a price that both a buyer and seller are willing to accept, the trade 
can be agreed directly between the brokers acting as their agents. However, in case that does not 
occur, floor-based exchanges often incorporate dealers known as specialists. The specialist 
assigned to a stock is expected to quote two-way prices at all times to accommodate market 
orders that do not find a counterparty in the trading crowd. 
In the continuous-auction model, limit orders supply liquidity apart from the specialist. 
Auctions on a stock exchange, like auctions at Sotheby’s or eBay, generally follow rules of price 
and time priority. Imagine that since the time of the last trade in the stock of XYZ Corp. a 
potential trader—a broker holding a customer order, a dealer trading for its own account, or a 
specialist—has bid $25.00 for XYZ; no one has yet agreed to sell at that price nor bid as much. 
Shortly thereafter, a broker arrives at the trading post with a customer limit order to buy at 
$25.10. The limit order now has priority, meaning that the next market order to sell will be 
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matched with that limit order and execute at $25.10. Should there be multiple bids at $25.10, the 
one first in time will be matched with an incoming market order up to the number of shares 
subject to that bid. 
A newer, and now dominant, form of market is an electronic limit order book, in which 
limit orders are entered and displayed electronically to attract trading interest. In both a 
traditional dealer market and a floor-based exchange, executions are done manually by 
telephonic or face-to-face interaction between the buying and selling broker. Electronic limit 
order books, by contrast, are automated. Marketable orders (market orders or limit orders that 
can be matched against a contra-side order at the same or a superior price) are executed 
electronically. These systems blur the distinction between a (professional) dealer and a 
(nonprofessional) investor and between an order-driven and quote-driven market. They also 
emphasize that ultimately a stock market is a set of rules that determine how potential buyers and 
sellers interact, now mostly implemented electronically by what is often called a “matching 
engine.” 
2.2 Institutions 
The specific institutions that make up the current U.S. equity market fall into four broad 
categories, which we will describe briefly in turn. 
2.2.1 Registered Exchanges 
There are twelve securities exchanges registered with and regulated by the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) that trade common stocks and related products and seven that 
trade options.561 The oldest and most prominent, the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) was for 
most of its existence a traditional, floor-based exchange as described above. In response to 
technological, competitive, and regulatory developments, however, the NYSE now refers to 
itself as a “hybrid” between an automated and a manual market. It offers automated access to its 
publicly displayed quotations. It still, however, incorporates “designated market makers,” the 
successors of the specialists, who trade to smooth order imbalances. Brokers overwhelmingly 
place orders and trade through its electronic trading system. 
                                                 
561 Several of these are affiliated with other exchanges and operate under a single brand, such as 
the four exchanges owned by the NYSE parent company, Intercontinental Exchange (NYSE, 
NYSE MKT, NYSE Arca, and NSX), the 4 BATS exchanges, and the three Nasdaq exchanges. 
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The second most prominent exchange, Nasdaq, was not registered with the SEC as an 
exchange until 2006. It began as a decentralized dealer market that used computers to display 
quotations but not to match customer orders with those quotations. But today, Nasdaq is an 
entirely automated, electronic matching system. 
As markets rely on software to match buy and sell orders automatically, the difference 
between an exchange and the other markets we will describe is increasingly a matter of the 
degree of organization and regulatory responsibility rather than the trading process itself. 
2.2.2 Alternative Trading Systems 
A significant portion of U.S. equity trading takes place through electronic limit order 
books owned and operated by broker-dealers. Historically, some display their limit orders 
publicly through a consolidated quotation system operated by the regulated exchanges. They are 
known formally as “electronic communication networks” or ECNs. Together with the registered 
securities exchanges, they make up what is popularly known as the “lit” market. Other 
proprietary systems do not publicly disseminate their orders and are known as “dark pools.” 
The distinction between lit and dark markets, however, is a matter of degree. Lit markets 
hold non-displayed orders. For example, a broker may hold a customer order but not make it 
public until it chooses to execute a trade. Lit markets also may permit non-displayed order types 
or display a smaller trading size than the actual order. Dark pools may communicate trading 
interest in the system to selected subscribers either as a formal offer or an indication of interest. 
From a regulatory perspective, trading systems, whether lit or dark, that are not regulated 
as exchanges are known as “alternative trading systems” (ATSs). As of December 1, 2016, there 
are 82 ATSs registered with the SEC, although only around 30 are active in equities.562 
2.2.3 Internalization 
Broker-dealers also internalize orders. That is, they either match orders they hold as agent 
or take the other side of the trade as principal. A few dealers do a very large internalization 
business by paying retail brokers to route customer orders to the dealer. Retail orders are highly 
attractive because the dealer can earn a spread with little adverse selection risk. A substantial 
                                                 
562 The list is available at Alternative Trading Systems with Form ATS on File with the SEC 
(November 4, 2016), https://www.sec.gov/foia/ats/atslist1116.pdf; see also FINRA, OTC 
Transparency Data, ATS Data, https://otctransparency.finra.org/TradingParticipants (ATSs 
reporting equity executions to FINRA). 
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portion of retail orders are internalized through payment for order flow arrangements.563 
Internalization is a type of dark liquidity, in the sense that broker-dealers do not publicly quote 
the prices and quantities at which they are willing to internalize orders. 
The regulatory definition of an ATS excludes broker-dealer internalization. However, by 
SEC rule, dealers who execute trades must generally disclose information about execution 
quality.564 At the end of 2016, 206 broker-dealers reported executions as internalizers and/or 
operators of ATSs.565 
2.2.4 OTC 
Equities that are not listed on a registered exchange are defined as over-the-counter 
(OTC) stocks. Some companies, mostly smaller and less-established ones, are not listed on an 
exchange. Their shares trade in a dealer market in which one or more dealers quote prices and 
customers or brokers bring market orders to a dealer for execution. 
Dealers may also execute trades in listed stocks off the exchange. In the era of manual 
markets, institutional trades in listed stocks negotiated and executed with an OTC dealer were 
known as the “third market,” while direct institution-to-institution trading was called the “fourth 
market.” These terms have become less prevalent in the era of electronic trading. 
2.3 Selection Among Trading Venues 
Different markets may offer different non-price advantages or disadvantages to a would-
be buyer or seller. These include commissions and fees and other transaction costs. A persistent 
issue for institutional investors is that their orders are relatively large and accordingly have 
market impact. Market (or price) impact refers to the tendency for prices to move in the direction 
of order flow, an effect that increases with order size. 
One reason for this tendency is that large orders are more likely to be informed than small 
orders. Market makers and other traders move prices when attempting to protect themselves 
against adverse selection. Facing a potentially informed trader, they widen the spread.566 
                                                 
563 See Market Structure Release, supra note 549, at 21. 
564 See Rule 605 of Regulation NMS, 17 C.F.R. §242.605 (2016). 
565 The list is available at http://www.finra.org/industry/market-centers. 
566 See Lawrence R. Glosten & Paul R. Milgrom, Bid, Ask and Transaction Prices in a Specialist 
Market with Heterogeneously Informed Traders, 14 J. FIN. ECON. 71 (1985); Albert S. Kyle, 
Continuous Auctions and Insider Trading, 53 ECONOMETRICA 1315 (1985). 
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Empirically, however, even large uninformed trades (such as an index fund buying in 
response to cash inflows) produce temporary market impact. This is often described, 
tautologically, as a consequence of other traders buying (selling) in anticipation of the price rise 
(fall) created by a large order. A non-tautological explanation relies on the assumption that 
market makers do not like to hold large net long or short positions. If a large trader begins 
making purchases, the market makers who sell to it accumulate short positions. They may then 
increase their bid and ask prices to induce investors to sell to them and thereby get back to a 
neutral position. The large purchaser perceives itself being front run by the market makers, who 
perceive themselves as short covering.567 However produced as a matter of theory, market 
impact is an important practical problem for institutional investors. Much of their trading 
strategy is designed to minimize it. 
With this brief introduction to market structure, we turn to the regulatory system. 
3. The Statutory Environment 
3.1 Pre-1975 
As initially enacted, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 was concerned principally with 
securities exchanges, defined then and now as organizations that make available “a market place 
or facilities for bringing together purchasers and sellers of securities.”568 Most of its substantive 
provisions covered registered exchanges, their member broker-dealers, and listed securities and 
their issuers. 
Section 12(a) of the statute bars brokers and dealers from transacting in any security on 
any exchange unless the security is registered on that specific exchange. In theory, this gives the 
listing exchange a monopoly on trading a listed stock. However, Section 12(f) originally gave the 
SEC the authority, upon application by an exchange, to afford unlisted trading privileges to a 
stock listed elsewhere. In the Unlisted Trading Privileges Act of 1994, Congress amended 
Section 12(f) to generally allow exchanges to trade unlisted stocks without SEC approval.569 
                                                 
567 See Phil Mackintosh, The Need for Speed: It’s Important, Even for VWAP Strategies, KNIGHT 
CAPITAL GROUP NEWS & PERSPECTIVES, https://www.kcg.com/news-perspectives/article/the-
need-for-speed-its-important-even-for-vwap-strategies. 
568 Securities Exchange Act 15 U.S.C. 78a-78kk (hereinafter SEA) § 3(a)(1). 
569 See Pub. L. No. 103-389, 108 Stat. 4081 (1994). 
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The Exchange Act also reflects the New Deal Congress’s skepticism that specialists and 
other securities dealers add value.570 Section 11 of the statute instructed the newly-created SEC 
to consider whether to ban principal trading by exchange members, either on or off the floor of 
the exchange.571 Exercised to the fullest, the provision could have meant the end of the specialist. 
The SEC ultimately chose not to make such a fundamental change to the NYSE’s structure. 
In 1936, Congress amended Section 15 of the Exchange Act to mandate registration of 
broker-dealers operating in the over-the-counter (OTC) market.572 Previously, the statute gave 
the SEC the authority to regulate OTC brokers if it chose. The Maloney Act of 1938 added 
Section 15A, authorizing any association of OTC broker-dealers to register with the SEC and 
gain regulatory power over its members similar to those of a registered exchange.573 The 
National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. (NASD) registered as the sole self-regulatory 
organization for OTC broker-dealers. In 2007, the NASD and NYSE merged their self-
regulatory, enforcement, and arbitration arms to create the Financial Industry Regulatory 
Authority (FINRA), which regulates exchange and OTC trading markets and broker-dealers. 
The Securities Acts Amendments of 1964 took a large step toward harmonizing treatment 
of the exchange and OTC markets by requiring large, widely-held companies whose equity 
securities were not traded on a regulated exchange to register those securities and become subject 
to periodic reporting and other requirements already imposed on exchange-traded companies.574  
The statute further required the NASD to adopt rules “governing the form and content of 
quotations” disseminated by its members.575 
The timing of these amendments was significant because the development of 
minicomputers and related peripherals was about to make it possible for OTC market makers to 
disseminate quotes by screen rather than by paper and telephone. In the late 1960s, the NASD 
began work on an inter-dealer quotation network, Nasdaq, that began operation in 1971. 
                                                 
570 For a more thorough description of this issue, see Paul G. Mahoney, The Stock Pools and the 
Securities Exchange Act, 51 J. FIN. ECON. 343 (1999). 
571 See Act of June 6, 1934, § 11(a), 47 Stat. 891 (since repealed). 
572 Act of May 27, 1936, § 3, 49 Stat. 1377, codified as amended at SEA § 15. 
573 Act of June 25, 1938, 52 Stat. 1070, codified as amended at SEA § 15A. 
574 Pub. L. 88-467, § 3(c), 78 Stat. 566, codified as amended at SEA § 12(g). 
575 Id. at § 7(a)(7), 78 Stat. 577, codified as amended at SEA § 15A(b)(11). 
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3.2 Structural Change and the Paperwork Crisis 
The rise of institutional investors during the 1960s put pressure on the NYSE’s floor-
based, continuous auction model. Institutions’ share of trading volume on the NYSE nearly 
doubled from 28% in 1960 to 52% in 1969.576 
Institutions typically trade in larger sizes than retail investors. The floor-based model did 
not entirely suit the needs of large traders, particularly their desire to minimize market impact. In 
the late 1960s, exchanges and their member brokers created new procedures for handling block 
trades, defined as trades of 10,000 shares or $200,000, whichever is less.577 
Under those procedures, a broker holding an order of block size may solicit contra-side 
interest from other brokers or investors “upstairs,” or off the trading floor. The broker, either 
acting as agent for both parties or taking the other side of the trade as principal, may then take 
the pre-negotiated “cross” to the floor for execution. The trade is executed under special rules of 
priority that generally permit the trading crowd or specialist to trade with the original order only 
if offering a better price than the crossed trade.578 This block trading was accordingly a hybrid 
between over-the-counter and exchange trading and between dark and lit orders. 
Institutions were also highly attentive to transaction costs, putting substantial pressure on 
the NYSE’s fixed commission model. Institutions sometimes looked to the third market for less 
expensive execution of trades in listed stocks. They also demanded other services, including 
equipment and research, from their brokers. Mutual funds used brokerage commissions to reward 
brokers who sold the funds’ products. 
The NYSE, although forced to accommodate these changes, was uneasy with them. It 
argued that the securities laws should be amended to eliminate third-market and other off-
exchange trading to prevent market fragmentation. Less sympathetic observers argued that the 
NYSE was simply trying to hamper competition and protect its commission structure. 
                                                 
576 Institutional Investor Study at 2168.  
577 NYSE Rule 127.10. For a description of the history of the NYSE’s rules on block trading, see 
Division of Market Regulation, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, Market 2000: An 
Examination of Current Equity Market Developments II-7 (1994). 
578 A detailed description of block trading and other crossed trades on the NYSE appears in Joel 
Hasbrouck, George Sofianos & Deborah Sosebee, New York Stock Exchange Systems and 
Trading Procedures (NYSE working paper, 1993). 
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A market crash at the end of the decade ensured that the NYSE would lose the argument. 
The Dow Jones Industrial Average fell by a third from early 1969 to mid-1970. Unprecedented 
trading volumes overwhelmed the cumbersome physical clearance and settlement process and 
caused further damage. The combination of falling prices and paperwork backlogs led to the 
failure of many smaller brokerage firms. 
Congress responded by creating the Securities Investor Protection Corporation to protect 
customer accounts in the event of a broker’s failure. It also began the process of amending the 
securities laws with the stated purpose of preventing a recurrence of the paperwork crisis. To set 
the stage for legislation, Congress instructed the SEC to study the role of institutional investors 
and report back its conclusions. 
The SEC took this opportunity to pursue its own views about market structure. Contrary 
to the NYSE’s desire to concentrate trading in listed stocks on the exchange, the SEC wanted to 
encourage competition among trading venues. But the mere existence of multiple trading venues 
was not, in the SEC’s view, sufficient to produce effective competition. Each trading venue 
separately reported transaction prices and volumes in the stocks it traded. Dealer transactions off 
an organized market were not necessarily reported at all. There was even less pre-trade 
transparency because exchanges viewed their specialists’ quotations as proprietary information. 
NYSE rules also limited member brokers’ ability to buy or sell a listed stock off the floor of the 
exchange. A broker holding a customer market order and wanting to execute it at the best 
available price accordingly faced substantial hurdles. 
In its report to Congress and a separate statement on the future of the trading markets, the 
SEC urged the creation of a central market, including links between venues trading listed stocks. 
It also raised concerns about the trading of unlisted securities in dealer markets, including the 
new Nasdaq market. The SEC suggested that interposing a dealer between the buyer and seller 
was not always necessary and might be unfair to customers. Dealer markets could be improved 
by introducing auction principles allowing customer orders to interact directly with one another. 
Even before Congress acted, the SEC began to use its statutory authority over stock 
exchange rules to force changes at the NYSE. It adopted Rule 19b-3, banning fixed commissions 
on stock exchanges effective May 1, 1975. 
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3.3 The 1975 Securities Acts Amendments 
Congress responded to the SEC’s report with the Securities Acts Amendments of 1975.579 
They added Section 11A to the Exchange Act, giving the SEC new regulatory authority to spur 
the creation of a “national market system” (NMS).580 Section 11A suggested that a broker 
holding a customer order to buy or sell a stock should be able to see the quotations in every 
market in which that stock traded and route the order to the market offering the best price.581 It 
also called for SEC registration and regulation of securities information processors, or companies 
disseminating trade reports and quotations.582 
Section 11A(a)(2) instructs the SEC to designate by rule the securities that will be 
eligible for trading in the national market system, termed “qualified securities” in the statute and 
“NMS securities” in the SEC’s rules.583 Congress did not, however, mandate any particular 
institutional structure for the trading markets but left it to the SEC to define and create the NMS.  
The statute also changed the relationship between exchanges, clearing agencies, and the 
NASD, on the one hand, and the SEC, on the other.584 It for the first time referred to the former 
entities as “self-regulatory organizations” (SROs)585 but simultaneously inserted the SEC more 
deeply into their regulatory role. The SROs must submit most proposed internal rule changes to 
the SEC for approval after public notice and comment.586  The SEC gained more authority to 
rescind or amend SRO rules.587 The statute also codified the abolition of fixed brokerage 
commissions.588 
                                                 
579 Pub. L. 94-29, 89 Stat. 97. 
580 SEA §11A. 
581 Id. §11A(a)(1)(C)(iv). 
582 Id. §11A(b). The term “securities information processor” is defined in Section 3(a)(22). 
583 See Rule 600 of Regulation NMS, 17 C.F.R. §242.600. 
584 The statute also gave the SEC regulatory authority over municipal securities broker-dealers 
and expanded the regulation of the clearance and settlement process. 
585 Id. §3(6), 89 Stat. 100, codified at SEA §3(a)(26). 
586 Id. §16, 89 Stat. 147, codified as amended at SEA §19(b). 
587 Id. §16, 89 Stat. 150, codified as amended at SEA §19(c). 
588 Id. §4, 89 Stat. 107, codified as amended at SEA §6(e)(1). 
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The 1975 amendments authorized the SEC to pursue changes it had contemplated since at 
least the early 1970s. The next section describes how it used that authority. 
4 Regulatory Implementation of the 1975 Amendments 
4.1 Information Links 
The SEC’s early efforts to create a national market system focused on information 
linkages.589 It took tentative steps in 1972 with the adoption of Rule 17a-15, which introduced 
consolidated reporting of transactions in listed stocks, whether taking place on the principal 
exchange, a regional exchange, or the third market. In particular, the rule required each securities 
exchange and securities association to adopt a transaction reporting plan to provide last-sale 
information for all transactions on its trading platform. Brokers and dealers were barred from 
transacting on a market unless the SEC declared its reporting plan effective. As a condition of 
effectiveness, the plan had to require any vendor purchasing transaction information to 
consolidate the information from all reporting markets into a single, real-time composite tape. 
The 1975 amendments gave the SEC additional tools to require a consolidated system of 
transaction and quotation reporting, including direct regulatory power over securities information 
processors. The SEC accordingly amended and designated Rule 17a-15 as Rule 11Aa3-1 (the 
rules adopted under Section 11A have since been moved to Regulation NMS).590 The amended 
rule continued to require effective transaction reporting plans but broadened the requirement to 
large-cap Nasdaq stocks as well as listed stocks. It also authorized SROs to act jointly to create 
transaction reporting plans. 
The SEC also adopted Rule 11Ac1-1, requiring SROs to make the best bids and offers in 
their trading systems continuously available to quotation vendors.591 A complementary 
                                                 
589 For further background and an insightful overview of secondary market issues at the turn of 
the millennium, see Laura Nyantung Beny, U.S. Secondary Stock Markets: A Survey of Current 
Regulatory and Structural Issues and a Reform Proposal to Enhance Competition, 2 COLUM. 
BUS. L. REV. 399 (2002). 
590 The rule is adopted under the provision of Exchange Act §11A(a)(3) authorizing the SEC to 
permit or require SROs to act jointly with respect to creating an NMS. The rule, as amended, has 
since been redesignated Rule 601 of Regulation NMS, 17 C.F.R. §242.601 (2016). 




provision, Rule 11Ac1-2, required that a securities information processor (SIP) display 
transaction and quote information on a consolidated basis.592 
Pursuant to Rule 11Aa3-1, the NYSE, Amex, regional exchanges, and Nasdaq cooperated 
to create four separate transaction and quotation reporting plans: one for NYSE-listed securities, 
one for securities listed on other exchanges, one for Nasdaq and certain OTC securities, and one 
for listed options. The Consolidated Tape Association, owned by the exchanges, is the SIP for 
transaction and quote data for listed securities; Nasdaq is its own information processor. Brokers 
operating alternative trading systems report trades executed in the system to an SRO-operated 
market where they “print,” or are publicly identified, as trades on the relevant venue. The SIP 
accordingly consolidates across all exchanges “core data” consisting of last-trade reports and 
each exchange’s current highest bids and lowest offers for each security.593 For each stock, the 
overall highest bid and lowest offer provided to the SIP and disseminated by it pursuant to a 
national market system transaction reporting plan are known as the national best bid (NBB) and 
national best offer (NBO), collectively called the NBBO.594 
As the national market system developed, a broker holding a customer order had many 
options for executing that order. The SEC accordingly adopted rules designed to give customers 
information about executions and order routing that could help them monitor their brokers. Rule 
11Ac1-3 required brokers opening a new customer account to give the customer information 
about the broker’s policies regarding payment for order flow.595  Rule 11Ac1-5 required 
execution venues to provide summary information about the quality of executions, including 
information about execution speeds, prices relative to the NBBO, and average effective and 
                                                 
592 Rule 11Ac1-2, as amended, has been redesignated Rule 603 of Regulation NMS, 17 C.F.R. 
§242.603 (2016). 
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realized spreads on orders of different sizes.596 Rule 11Ac1-6 required broker-dealers to disclose 
summary information about their order routing decisions.597 
4.2 Order Handling and Execution 
4.2.1 ITS 
In the 1975 amendments, Congress encouraged the SEC to remove barriers to 
competition between markets. The SEC interpreted the statutory language not merely to give it 
authority to require information linkages, but to regulate order handling and execution within 
each trading platform—in short, to shape the institutional structure of the markets by rule.598 
Its first exercise of this authority came in 1978. The SEC encouraged the NYSE, Amex, 
and several regional exchanges to create an Intermarket Trading System (ITS).599 The ITS 
created an electronic link between the exchanges allowing brokers to route market orders to the 
exchange offering the best price at the time of the order. 
The rules of the participating exchanges were amended to discourage trade-throughs, or 
executions in one market at a price inferior to that available in another linked market. In general, 
those rules gave a broker a right of redress when an order it publicly displayed was traded 
through.600 The ITS reflected the SEC’s view that it could and should change the rules and 
procedures of individual trading venues to require member brokers to take market orders to the 
market offering the best price regardless of the broker’s or even the customer’s preferences. 
4.2.2 NYSE Rule 390 
The ITS integrated the regional exchanges with the principal exchanges. Bringing the 
third market fully into the ITS took another two decades. The NYSE’s Rule 390, which (with 
                                                 
596 Rule 11Ac1-5, as amended, has been redesignated Rule 605 of Regulation NMS, 17 C.F.R. 
§242.605 (2016). 
597 Rule 11Ac1-6, as amended, has been redesignated Rule 606 of Regulation NMS, 17 C.F.R. 
§242.606 (2016). 
598 This was not an uncontroversial reading of the statute. See Dale A. Oesterle, Congress’s 1975 
Directions to the SEC for the Creation of a National Market System: Is the SEC Operating 
Outside the Mandate? AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE MONOGRAPH (May 2003). 
599 See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 14416, 43 Fed. Reg. 4354, 4357 (1978). 
600 See Order Approving Proposed Rule Changes, Midwest Stock Exchange, Inc., et al., 
Exchange Act Release No. 17704, 46 Fed. Reg. 22520 (1981). 
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some exceptions) required that any NYSE member firm’s principal trades in listed stocks take 
place on the exchange, stood in the way of complete integration. 
In 1980, the SEC adopted Rule 19c-3, which made Rule 390 inapplicable to any stock 
listed after April 26, 1979. In 1982, the SEC required the exchanges and the NASD to extend the 
ITS to third market makers with respect to “Rule 19c-3” stocks not grandfathered into Rule 390. 
It was not until the end of 1999, however, that the NYSE, under SEC pressure, proposed to 
eliminate Rule 390 altogether.601 
4.2.3 The Order Handling Rules 
In the early 1990s, an academic study of the Nasdaq market created momentum for new 
and consequential market structure regulations. The study found that Nasdaq market makers 
rarely quoted prices in odd eighths.602 In other words, the typical spread was at least 25 cents 
even though the minimum price increment at the time was 12.5 cents. Although there were 
potentially innocent explanations for the practice, the SEC concluded that Nasdaq’s rules and 
procedures did not provide competitive pricing to retail investors. 
Market makers at that time were under no obligation to display customer limit orders. A 
market maker might accordingly quote $20 bid, $20.25 ask and receive a customer limit order to 
sell at $20.125. The market maker might or might not choose to “price improve” and fill the 
customer order at the limit price. If it chose not to do so, the order remained on its books, to be 
executed only when the market maker’s bid price reached $20.125. In the meantime, incoming 
market orders to buy would execute at the market maker’s $20.25 ask rather than at the customer 
limit price. 
From Nasdaq’s perspective, this was a fundamental design feature of the competing 
market-maker model. The NYSE assigns a single specialist to a stock, but that specialist 
maintains a central limit order book containing limit orders that brokers have left with the 
specialist. Orders on the book are executed under auction principles offering price/time priority. 
Customer orders on an exchange accordingly interact with one another and thereby compete with 
the specialist’s quotations. In a market-maker system, the market maker internalizes orders, 
                                                 
601 See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 42758, https://www.sec.gov/rules/sro/ny9948o.htm. 
602 See William G. Christie & Paul H. Schultz, Why do NASDAQ Market Makers Avoid Odd-
Eighth Quotes?, 49 J. FIN. 1813 (1994). Specifically, Christie and Schultz studied 100 actively 
traded Nasdaq-listed stocks and found that 70 almost never traded at an odd eighth. For the 
remaining stocks, odd eighth quotes were observed, although even eighths were more common. 
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executing them against its own public quotes rather than against limit orders it or another dealer 
holds. It therefore captures the spread on most or all trades. Competition comes from the 
existence of multiple market makers in a stock, not from direct interaction of customer orders. 
The SEC, however, concluded that requiring market makers to display price-improving 
customer limit orders would reduce spreads, reviving a concept it had first floated in the 1970s. It 
accordingly adopted the so-called Order Handling Rules in 1996 to take effect in 1997.603 New 
rule 11Ac1-4 required a market maker, with certain exceptions, to publish the price and size of 
any customer limit order that either improved the market maker’s quotation or increased size at 
the quoted price.604 
The Order Handling Rules also included an amendment to Rule 11Ac1-1 requiring a 
market maker that posts a quotation in an electronic communications network to make the same 
price available, in at least the minimum quote size, in the primary market. The ECN itself may 
meet the market maker’s obligation by including its best bid and offer in the consolidated 
quotation system and providing all broker-dealers the ability to execute a trade against its public 
quote. 
The number and trading volumes of ECNs increased after adoption of the Order Handling 
Rules. There is ample reason to think there is a causal link. Rule 11Ac1-4 ensured that orders 
submitted to an ECN could appear on Nasdaq screens in direct competition with market maker 
quotes. While prior rules mandating communication linkages indirectly affected market 
structure, the Order Handling Rules directly mandated a new type of competition among trading 
platforms. 
It is also worth noting that the Order Handling Rules did not require that public orders 
take priority over securities professionals trading for their own account, a policy goal the SEC 
suggested as far back as 1973.605 For a time, the Nasdaq market remained a decentralized dealer 
market based principally on internalization of customer orders. A dealer willing to match the best 
                                                 
603 See Order Execution Obligations (Rules 11Ac1-4 and 11Ac1-1), Securities Exchange Act 
Release No. 37619A, https://www.sec.gov/rules/final/37619a.txt. 
604 Rule 11Ac1-4, as amended, has been redesignated as Rule 604 of Regulation NMS, 17 C.F.R. 
§ 242.604. 
605 See Securities and Exchange Commission, Policy Statement on the Structure of a Central 
Market System (1973). 
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bid or offer in the system could execute a customer market order as principal even though 
another dealer held a customer limit order at the same price. 
4.3 Regulations ATS and NMS 
After adoption of the Order Handling Rules, the SEC accelerated the pace of regulating 
market structure. In addition to the final abolition of NYSE Rule 390, discussed above, the most 
important developments were the adoption of Regulations ATS and NMS, which together exert a 
substantial influence on how equity markets operate today. 
4.3.1 Regulation ATS 
In 1969, Institutional Networks Corp. (later Instinet) began operation as an electronic 
trading system. Unlike Nasdaq, which gave dealers the opportunity to update and display their 
quotations on-screen, Instinet catered to institutional investors, allowing them to trade directly 
with one another without a dealer. Investors could enter limit orders and indications of interest 
into the system. Initially handling listed stocks in competition with the third market, Instinet and 
other proprietary trading systems would later become a major presence in Nasdaq stocks. 
The question naturally arose whether these systems are exchanges. Both Nasdaq and 
Instinet operate facilities for bringing together buyers and sellers and therefore meet the statutory 
definition of an exchange. But the definition itself is overbroad. A telephone system brings 
together buyers and sellers of securities, but it was never thought necessary to register AT&T as 
a securities exchange. The SEC did not push the regulatory definition to its limit, but applied the 
term only to organizations that centralized quotations on a continuous basis and executed 
trades.606 
It was not terribly consequential whether Nasdaq was required to register as an exchange. 
The market was operated by the NASD, an organization with regulatory powers similar to those 
of an exchange and subject to similar SEC oversight. Soon the SEC would begin adding the term 
“or interdealer quotation system” alongside the term “exchange” in many of its regulations. 
Instinet, however, was not initially a regulated entity. In 1969, the SEC accordingly 
proposed a rule regulating “automated trading information systems,” defined as automated 
systems for communicating indications of interest or offers to buy or sell securities.607 The 
proposed regulation, Rule 15c2-10, would have required such systems to file and have the SEC 
                                                 
606 See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 27611, 55 Fed. Reg. 1890, 1900 (1990). 
607 See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8661, 34 Fed. Reg. 12952 (1969). 
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declare effective a plan describing the system and its rules and agreeing to maintain certain 
records. 
As the SEC considered the proposed rule, however, Instinet sought to register as a 
broker-dealer, offering a different solution to the regulatory gap. As a registered broker-dealer, 
Instinet would be subject to SEC and NASD oversight. Moreover, by becoming a member of one 
or more exchanges, Instinet could access the order book of those exchanges. Eventually, it would 
offer its institutional subscribers “direct market access,” or the ability to look through the broker-
dealer and interact directly with the exchange’s order book. 
Instinet registered as a broker-dealer and became a member of several regional 
exchanges, and the SEC did not adopt proposed rule 15c2-10. Instinet and other proprietary 
computer-based trading systems expanded and competed with the primary markets—the NYSE, 
Amex, and Nasdaq—for institutional and broker-dealer order flow. They offered investors the 
opportunity to enter orders and have them matched automatically and rapidly by computer 
algorithm. 
Although initially conceived as a way to facilitate block-size trades in listed stocks, this 
did not become the mainstay of the ECNs’ business. When limit orders did not match internally, 
the ECNs needed a way to access other sources of liquidity. Accessing manual orders on the 
floor of an exchange was cumbersome compared to accessing market maker quotations through a 
Nasdaq terminal. The ECNs therefore came to specialize in trading Nasdaq stocks until the 
NYSE’s transformation into a largely electronic market. 
As ECNs grew, they became unwilling to rely solely on informal guidance from the SEC 
staff and sought formal assurance that the Division of Market Regulation would not recommend 
enforcement action should a system not register as an exchange. In the mid-1980s, the Division 
issued several no-action letters to electronic trading systems conditioned on their providing 
various ongoing data to the SEC.608 The SEC would later formalize the reporting conditions in 
these no-action letters by adopting Rule 17a-23.609 The rule required any registered broker-dealer 
operating an automated trading system to report information about participants, orders, trades, 
and other data to the SEC on a quarterly basis. 
                                                 
608 A list of no-action letters appears in Securities Exchange Act Release No. 26708, 54 Fed. 
Reg. 15429, 15430 n. 3 (1989). 
609 Rule 17a-23 was repealed by the Regulation ATS adopting release cited infra note 613. 
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Traditional stock exchanges complained that the SEC’s use of the no-action approach 
rather than formal rulemaking kept the exchanges from participating in the regulatory process. 
They argued, moreover, that the proprietary networks would likely be fair-weather markets. 
During times of substantial volatility, liquidity might disappear on the electronic markets, 
leaving the slack to be picked up by stock exchange specialists, who are required to maintain 
orderly markets, and Nasdaq market makers, who are required to quote continuous two-way 
prices. 
At the same time, the SEC became concerned about market fragmentation. In particular, 
it worried that orders in the public markets did not necessarily interact with those in the 
proprietary systems. Retail investors might therefore receive inferior prices to those available to 
institutions trading in the automated systems. The concern was not hypothetical; the SEC found 
that some Nasdaq market makers quoted prices on Instinet that were better than their quotes in 
the Nasdaq system.610 
Ironically, however, the 1975 National Market System amendments complicated the 
SEC’s attempts to bring proprietary trading systems into the national market system. The 
amendments were drafted under the assumption that a stock exchange would be a membership 
organization and that its members would all be registered broker-dealers.611 ECNs operated on a 
different business model; they were proprietary and allowed direct access to institutional 
investors. They could not maintain that business model and comply with the Exchange Act’s 
requirements for registered exchanges. Any integration of those systems into the national market 
system, accordingly, would have to take place under the rubric of broker-dealer regulation. 
In 1996, as part of the Order Handling Rules, the SEC required stock exchange specialists 
and Nasdaq market makers to make publicly available any price quoted on a proprietary system 
representing an improvement on their displayed prices.612 Shortly thereafter, Congress gave the 
SEC general exemptive authority, making it possible for the SEC to expand its interpretation of 
                                                 
610 See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 38672, 62 Fed. Reg. 30485, 30492 (1997). 
611 See, e.g., Securities Exchange Act §6(b) (regulating the relationship between an exchange and 
its members); §6(c) (requiring that members be registered broker-dealers). 
612 See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 37619A, 61 Fed. Reg. 48290 (1996) (adopting the 
so-called “Order Handling Rules”). 
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the term “exchange” while applying different regulatory standards to different types of 
exchanges. 
The SEC accordingly overhauled its rules relating to exchanges and other markets in 
1998.613 The new rules define an “exchange” to include any organization that brings together the 
orders of multiple buyers and sellers and uses non-discretionary rules or processes to execute 
trades.614 The definition excludes broker-dealer internalization. In the adopting release, the SEC 
also declared that it had no objection to a registered exchange demutualizing and operating as a 
for-profit organization, which the registered exchanges have subsequently done.615 
Not every entity meeting the broad definition of “exchange” must register as such. An 
“alternative trading system” (ATS), defined as an exchange that does not operate as a self-
regulatory body (that is, does not seek to regulate the conduct of its subscribers apart from their 
use of the system) may instead operate under Regulation ATS.616 
Regulation ATS keeps in place the longstanding practice under which ATSs register as 
broker-dealers. As the adopting release summarizes, any ATS handling less than five percent of 
the aggregate trading volume in each security it trades need only “(1) file with the Commission a 
notice of operation and quarterly reports; (2) maintain records, including an audit trail of 
transactions; and (3) refrain from using the words ‘exchange’, ‘stock market’, or similar terms in 
its name.”617 
However, any ATS that handles at least 5% of the trading volume in any national market 
system security is potentially subject to two forms of integration into the national market system 
under the “order display” rule and the “fair access” rule of Regulation ATS. The order display 
rule requires an ATS that displays subscriber orders to potential counterparties to create a link to 
an exchange or securities association to display the best bid and offer in its system for any such 
security. It must also allow any member broker-dealer of the linked exchange or association to 
execute trades using the same rules of priority as the linked exchange or association. 
                                                 
613 See Regulation of Exchanges and Alternative Trading Systems, Securities Exchange Act 
Release No. 40760, 63 Fed. Reg. 70844 (1998) (“ATS adopting release”). 
614 17 C.F.R. § 242.3b-16(a) (2016). 
615 See ATS adopting release, supra note 613, at 70848. 
616 17 C.F.R. §§ 242.300 – 303 (2016). 
617 ATS adopting release, supra note 613, at 70847. 
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The “fair access” rule applies at the same volume threshold but does not apply to an ATS 
that uses strictly passive pricing (that is, pricing derived from public last-sale prices) and that 
does not display orders. It requires an ATS to establish written standards for subscriber access 
and permit any person meeting those standards to subscribe. 
In principle, then, Regulation ATS inaugurated a process of bringing ATSs into the 
national market system by bringing their best bids and offers into the public quote stream and 
giving the public the ability to execute against them. But the regulation has not been the primary 
driver of integration. Individual ATSs have generally not accounted for a sufficient portion of 
trading in individual stocks to trigger the order display and fair access requirements.618 
Individual ATSs choose to be a “lit” ECN or a dark pool for reasons of business strategy rather 
than regulatory requirement. Moreover, even a large dark pool could avoid triggering the order 
display rule by not displaying system orders to other subscribers, but instead communicating 
only indications of interest. 
In 2009, the SEC proposed to amend Regulation ATS to broaden application of the order 
display rule. The proposed amendments would lower the threshold for public display of ATS 
best bid and offer quotations dramatically, to 0.25% of trading volume.619 They would also 
define certain indications of interest as orders. Operators of ATSs argued that the existence of 
non-displayed pools of liquidity was not a new phenomenon and was not detrimental to public 
investors.620 At the time of this writing, the amendments have not been adopted. 
4.3.2 Regulation NMS 
In 2005, the SEC reorganized existing regulations adopted pursuant to the 1975 national 
market system amendments and added significant new regulations. Rules previously adopted 
under Section 11A and described above were moved to a new Regulation NMS. 
The most notable and controversial of the new rules was the so-called trade-through rule, 
or in the SEC’s terminology the order protection rule, Rule 611.621 Recall that the ITS Plan 
                                                 
618 See Regulation of Non-Public Trading Interest, Securities Exchange Act Release No. 60997, 
at 24 (“Few if any dark pool ATSs exceed the 5% threshold for any NMS stocks…”). 
619 Id. 
620 See Goldman Sachs Group, Market Structure Overview (Sept. 2009), 
https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-21-09/s72109-53.pdf. 
621 Rule 611 of Regulation NMS, 17 C.F.R. §242.611. 
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requires the participating exchanges to take certain steps to discourage trade-throughs in listed 
stocks. By contrast, the order protection rule imposes a mandatory requirement that every 
exchange, securities association, and ATS adopt rules reasonably designed to prevent trade-
throughs of “protected quotations” in NMS stocks.622 Protected quotations are the best publicly 
displayed bid and offer on the exchanges or OTC market, but only to the extent those quotations 
can be automatically accessed. An order on a floor-based exchange that would require manual 
execution is not a protected quotation. 
Rule 611 is designed in part to protect investors entering market orders from receiving 
inferior prices. This is not, however, the principal objective. A broker acting as the customer’s 
agent owes a duty of best execution that would usually (although not always) lead the broker to 
route the order to the trading venue offering the best price even without a trade-through rule. 
Exceptions would occur when the customer instructs the broker to trade in a particular venue or 
when the customer or broker believes trading through the best bid or offer could reduce market 
impact. In short, trade-through protection is not principally for the benefit of market orders. 
Instead, the rule was justified as an attempt to reward and thereby encourage the 
provision of liquidity through limit orders. If a trader knows that any limit order he or she enters 
will be protected against a trade-through when it is the best-priced bid or offer, traders will be 
more likely to enter limit orders, all other things equal. 
There is room for debate, however, about whether the order protection rule was necessary 
for this purpose. The two dissenting commissioners argued that there was little evidence that 
trade-throughs were a problem on Nasdaq (which was not subject to the ITS trade-through rules) 
or that traders were discouraged from entering limit orders there. Some commentators had 
argued in favor of an opt-out provision that would have permitted the trader entering a market 
order to ignore the best-priced order, presumably pursuant to a trading strategy designed to 
reduce market impact. The final rule did not include an opt-out, consistent with the view that the 
principal beneficiaries of trade-through protection are those who enter limit orders. 
A related provision, Rule 610(d), requires SROs to prohibit a trading venue from 
displaying quotations that lock or cross protected quotations. A bid price in one market that 
equals the (previously entered) ask price in another “locks” that quotation, while a bid price that 
                                                 
622 At the time of Regulation NMS’s adoption, Nasdaq was not yet a registered exchange. Rule 
611 accordingly extended trade-through protection for the first time to Nasdaq NMS stocks. 
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exceeds that ask price “crosses” the quotation. Similarly, an ask price that is the same or less 
than a previously entered bid locks or crosses that quote, respectively. 
The logic behind the rule is that submitting a locking or crossing quotation is a way to 
avoid trading with the best bid or offer without violating the trade-through rule. Imagine, for 
example, that a trader prefers to trade in Venue A rather than Venue B, perhaps because the 
former typically has better depth, resulting in less price impact. At some point in time, Venue B 
displays an ask price of $20.01 for a particular stock, while Venue A displays an ask price of 
$20.02. Absent the trade-through rule, the trader would simply ignore the quote in Venue B and 
purchase the shares offered at $20.02 in Venue A. But the trade-through rule prohibits this. 
An alternative strategy to execute the trade in Venue A is to post a bid at $20.01 there in 
hopes that the bid will attract trading interest. Note that this strategy locks the ask price in Venue 
B and is inconsistent with the spirit of the trade-through rule, which aims to reward the person 
posting the best ask. Rule 610(d) comes to the rescue of Venue B by forbidding Venue A to 
display the $20.01 bid. 
Regulation NMS also regulates execution access to quotations displayed by various 
markets. Effective trade-through protection requires that brokers be able to route customer orders 
quickly to the venue providing the best price. As described above, the SEC spurred the creation 
of the ITS that facilitated routing among exchanges. However, Regulation NMS does not 
mandate the use of the ITS or any other specific link between trading centers. In practice, 
exchanges and ATSs typically offer brokers private links to their systems, giving those willing to 
pay for such links rapid execution access to displayed quotations. Rule 610(a) prohibits SROs 
from imposing unfairly discriminatory terms that inhibit customer access, through member 
brokers, to trading facilities regulated by the SRO. 
 Rule 610(c) caps fees for access to quotations. In particular, no trading center can charge 
more than $0.003/share for execution access to a protected quotation or to certain other displayed 
quotations. The rule effectively limits the amount of the “take” fee imposed pursuant to a maker-
taker fee structure, described in more detail in Section 6.2.2 below. 
Finally, Regulation NMS added a new “sub-penny” provision, Rule 612, restricting 
trading venues from quoting or accepting quotations in increments of less than one penny so long 
as the stock price is at least $1.00. The rule was designed to prevent traders from stepping ahead, 
or making an economically inconsequential improvement to the best quotation in order to obtain 
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priority over it. In effect, the practice of stepping ahead is inconsistent with the spirit of the 
price/time priority system, which gives priority to the first-in-time order at a given price until an 
economically superior price is quoted. Rule 612 does not, however, forbid executing trades in 
sub-penny increments. A crossing network that executes trades at the midpoint of the quoted 
spread can execute in a half-penny increment. Similarly, a broker-dealer internalizing an order 
can price improve by less than a penny. 
Adoption of Regulation NMS, like adoption of the order handling rules, was followed by 
significant changes in market structure that are likely due, at least in part, to the regulatory 
change. Shortly before the final adoption of the rule, both the NYSE and Nasdaq acquired ECNs 
and prepared to transform themselves into mostly electronic markets allowing for automated 
execution against publicly displayed quotations. New exchanges and ATSs quickly began 
operation. In particular, the number of ATSs operating as dark pools increased from 10 in 2002 
to 29 in 2009.623 
5 The Regulation of Trading Practices  
The centerpiece of the Securities Exchange Act, for the purposes of regulating 
misconduct by traders, is § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder. Section 10(b) broadly 
prohibits any “manipulative or deceptive device[s] or contrivance[s] in contravention of” rules 
and regulations prescribed by the SEC “as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for 
the protection of investors.”624 Rule 10b-5, adopted without fanfare in 1943, has served for more 
than eighty years as the workhorse of federal securities enforcement.625 It prohibits, inter alia, 
“in connection with the purchase or sale of any security,” employing “any device, scheme, or 
artifice to defraud” and engaging “in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or 
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person.” The most important forms of trader 
misconduct proscribed under § 10(b) are insider trading and manipulation.  
5.1 Insider Trading 
Alongside the rise of high-frequency trading, perhaps no aspect of securities law has 
ignited the popular imagination as much as insider trading law, which generally prohibits 
                                                 
623 See Regulation of non-public trading interest, supra note 618, at 6 (increase from 2002 to 
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624 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b). 
625 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5. 
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individuals from trading while in possession of material nonpublic information in violation of a 
duty owed to their employer. The modern story of insider trading law begins with the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Chiarella v. United States,626 which held that an insider has no duty to 
disclose material, nonpublic information or abstain from trading under § 10(b) based on “the 
mere possession of nonpublic information.”627 Chiarella articulated the “classical” theory of 
insider trading that a trade based on material nonpublic information violates Rule 10b-5 if 
alongside possession of material nonpublic information there was “a relationship of trust and 
confidence between the parties to a transaction.”628 The Supreme Court subsequently 
supplemented it with the “misappropriation” theory of insider trading in the O’Hagan case,629 
which held that transactions based on material nonpublic information violate Rule 10b-5 when 
the trade “was in breach of a duty [of loyalty and confidentiality] owed to the source of the 
information.”630 While the classical theory would only seem to reach corporate insiders of an 
issuer of securities, who plausibly owe a duty to all the shareholders of that firm who own its 
securities, the misappropriation theory reaches beyond insiders of the issuer to insiders within 
other institutions who possess material nonpublic information about the issuer, and may owe 
their own institution a duty of loyalty. In other words, the “relationship of trust and confidence” 
need no longer exist “between the parties to a transaction” for the purposes of insider trading 
law. 
The source of additional complications—and an issue recently ruled upon by the U.S. 
Supreme Court—is the applicability of Rule 10b-5 to persons who directly or indirectly learn of 
(and trade on) material nonpublic information (“tippees”) from a person who, if he traded on that 
                                                 
626 445 U.S. 222, 235 (1980). The origins of federal insider trading law begin with the SEC’s 
opinion in Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961), finding that a person with a special 
relationship with a company violates Rule 10b-5 if that person trades the company’s stock while 
in possession of material nonpublic information without first disclosing it. The Second Circuit, in 
SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d. Cir. 1968), radicalized Cady, Roberts by 
dispensing with the special relationship requirement and holding that “anyone in possession of 
material inside information must either disclose it to the investing public or . . . must abstain 
from trading . . . while such inside information remains undisclosed.” Id. at 848. 
627 445 U.S. 222, 235 (1980). 
628 Id. at 230. 
629 United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642 (1997). 
630 Id. at 652. 
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information himself, would be acting unlawfully (“tippers”).631 Tippees will often owe no duty 
of loyalty or confidence to either an issuer or an institution holding material information about 
the issuer, but the Supreme Court inventively found a way to apply insider trading laws to both 
tippers and tippees. In Dirks v. SEC, the Court held that “a tippee assumes a fiduciary duty to the 
shareholders of a corporation not to trade on material nonpublic information [] when the insider 
has breached his fiduciary duty to the shareholders by disclosing his information to the tippee 
and the tippee knows or should know that there has been a breach,”632 and, in addition, for the 
tipper to breach her duty to the shareholders, the source must “personally . . . benefit, directly or 
indirectly, from [her] disclosure.”633 A tippee, effectively, is deemed to have become a 
“participant after the fact” in the tipper’s breach of her relationship of trust and confidence to an 
issuer when the tipper provided information to someone likely to trade on it. Further downstream 
tippees, who receive information from a predecessor tippee, can also violate Rule 10b-5, either 
through awareness of the breach by the original source, including her personal benefit,634 or 
where the downstream tippee is breaching her own duty of confidentiality to the person 
providing her with the information.635 
The issue of tipper liability recently returned to the Supreme Court in United States v. 
Salman,636 where the Court analyzed the gift prong of the personal benefit test as applied to a 
remote tippee. In Salman, the tipper and initial tippee had clearly violated Rule 10b-5. The 
                                                 
631 For a fuller discussion of these issues, see Merritt B. Fox, Lawrence R. Glosten & Gabriel V. 
Rauterberg, Informed Trading and its Regulation, J. CORP. L. (forthcoming 2018), and the 
literature discussed there. 
632 463 U.S. 646, 660 (1983) (citation omitted). 
633 Id. at 662. Where an insider provides a gift of information to a relative or friend, the personal 
benefit requirement is also satisfied. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 664. See also Adam C. Pritchard, Dirks 
and the Genesis of Personal Benefit, 68 SMU L. REV. 857 (2015) (discussing the origins of the 
personal benefit test). 
634 See, e.g., SEC v. Musella, 678 F.Supp. 1060, 1062-64 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (defendants “should 
have known that fiduciary duties were being breached with respect to confidential, non-public 
information”); In re Motel 6 Sec. Litig., 161 F. Supp. 2d 227, 242 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (“a 
defendant’s subjective belief that information received ‘was obtained in breach of a fiduciary 
duty . . . may . . . be shown by circumstantial evidence’”). 
635 In each of these two cases, if someone who himself is prohibited from trading instead, or in 
addition, tips someone else, he would violate Rule 10b-5 as a tipper.   
636 Salman v. United States, 580 U.S. __ (2016). 
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dispute concerned the defendant, who had received information from the initial tippee and knew 
the improper origin of the information, but argued that there was no evidence that the tippee had 
received a personal benefit from communicating the information, as the Second Circuit's 
decision in United States v. Newman,637 supposedly required. The Court clarified that the tipper 
need not receive a pecuniary benefit, and that a close familial relationship or friendship was 
sufficient to infer that the defendant receiver a personal benefit from making a gift.    
The tipping situations above involved information originating within an issuer. The law 
differs for information originating within an institution other than the issuer and importantly 
discriminates between two distinct scenarios. In the first, a source with a duty of confidentiality 
to an institution willingly provides material nonpublic information to a tippee who has no duty to 
that institution. The tipper had no authorization to disclose the information, and the tippee trades 
based on it. Here, the tipper violates Rule 10b-5 under the misappropriation theory by breaching 
a duty of confidentiality in providing information to an individual likely to trade based on it.638 
The tippee violates Rule 10b-5 if he was aware of the breach by the source when trading due to 
the information.639 In the second scenario, a tippee owes a duty of confidentiality to the tipper 
and/or her employer institution and does not know the tip to be authorized. Here, the tippee 
violates the misappropriation theory quite clearly. Further downstream tippees can also violate 
Rule 10b-5 under applicable versions of the “participant after the fact” and misappropriation 
theories.  
While the academic debate regarding the desirability of insider trading law continues,640 
the law remains politically popular and vigorously enforced. In light of this reality, practically 
                                                 
637 773 F.3d 438 (2d Cir. 2014). 
638 See, e.g., SEC v. Yun, 327 F.3d 1263, 1274-75 (11th Cir. 2003); SEC v. Gansman, 657 F.3d 
85, 92 (2d Cir. 2011); 18 DONALD C. LANGEVOORT, INSIDER TRADING REGULATION, 
ENFORCEMENT AND PREVENTION § 6:13 (2015). 
639 See, e.g., United States v. Falcone, 257 F.3d 226, 234 (2d Cir. 2001) (“the government was 
simply required to prove a breach by Salvage, the tipper, of a duty owed to the owner of the 
misappropriated information, and defendant’s knowledge that the tipper had breached the duty”). 
640 The range of classic papers on insider trading is far too vast to summarize, but for two recent 
analyses reflecting the current state of debate, see, e.g., Stephen Bainbridge, An Overview of 
Insider Trading Law and Policy, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON INSIDER TRADING 1 (Stephen M. 
Bainbridge ed. 2013), and Laura Nyantung Beny, Insider Trading Laws and Stock Markets 
Around the World: An Empirical Contribution to the Theoretical Law and Economics Debate, 32 
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open questions largely concern how an optimal anti-insider trading regime should work. Here, a 
series of separate issues appear, including whether we should replace our current common law 
approach with a statutory one, and how to resolve ongoing debates regarding the scope of tippee 
liability. In particular, Salman fails to provide precise answers regarding fact patterns in which 
material nonpublic information is provided as a gift among acquaintances in social contexts in 
the financial world. Careful analysis could provide clarity for courts in this regard. 
5.2 Manipulation 
Securities manipulation is expressly prohibited by statute, but notoriously difficult to 
define, analyze, or prosecute. There are two express prohibitions. Section 10(b) prohibits the use 
of “any manipulative or deceptive device” in connection with trading a security in contravention 
of rules promulgated by the SEC.641 Section 9(a)(2) proscribes effecting “a series of 
transactions” in a security (i) that “creat[e] actual or apparent active trading”  or affect its price,  
(ii) “for the purpose of inducing the purchase or sale of such security by others.”642 While § 
9(a)(2)’s language may seem clearly applicable to manipulation, its jurisprudence has failed to 
robustly develop for a number of reasons,643 leaving § 10(b) as the basis of most manipulation 
enforcement.  
Scholarship has identified three principal forms of manipulative activity: manipulations 
involving misrepresentations, such as driving up a stock’s price by making false statements about 
its value, which is ambiguously similar to fraud; transaction-based manipulations, based on 
trading a security to affect its price, where the manipulation’s profitability arises from a distinct 
                                                                                                                                                             
J. CORP. L. 237 (2007) (hereinafter Beny, Insider Trading Laws), and the sources cited therein. 
See, e.g., Beny, Insider Trading Laws at 239-244, n.1-3, 6-13, 32, and elsewhere. 
641 See 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b). Neither the statute, nor subsequent rulemaking has further defined 
“manipulative,” however. Further, despite the explicit reference to manipulation, rules 
promulgated pursuant to Section 10(b) have made no mention of manipulation except for Rule 
10b-1, which simply refers back to Section 9 to the effect that an act or omission that would 
violate Section 9 if made in connection with an exchange-listed security is a violation of Section 
10(b) whether registered or not. 
642 See 15 U.S.C. § 78i(a)(2). 
643 Perhaps foremost among these is that until 2010, § 9(a)(2) could only apply to securities 
traded on exchanges, which due to their volume and liquidity are less likely to be manipulated 
than OTC securities. Indeed, until 2006, NASDAQ was not even an exchange. Some courts have 
also interpreted § 9(a)’s scienter requirement to be more demanding than Rule 10b-5. See, e.g., 
Chemetron Corp. v. Bus. Funds, Inc., 682 F.2d 1149, 1162 (5th Cir. 1982). 
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transaction referring to that price; and market manipulation (also known as “trade-based” 
manipulation),644 where the manipulation consists solely of a trading strategy in the securities 
markets.645 
The law applying § 10(b) to the various types of manipulation is significantly confused 
with a split among the federal circuit courts as to central questions in manipulation 
jurisprudence.646 The circuit split involves whether market manipulation, without an additional 
act that is itself unlawful, can be proscribed by § 10(b).647 The Third and Seventh Circuit hold 
that a manipulation cannot consist of actual trades without some further improper act, i.e., that 
market manipulation is not unlawful under Rule 10b-5.648  
                                                 
644 See Franklin Allen & Douglas Gale, Stock Price Manipulation, 5 REV. FIN. STUD. 503 (1992) 
(providing seminal model of manipulation executed exclusively through actual transactions). 
645 On transaction-based manipulation, see Steve Thel, $850,000 in Six Minutes – The Mechanics 
of Securities Manipulation, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 219, 251-55 (1994). On market manipulation, 
there is a large literature, but some prominent sources include Albert S. Kyle & S. Viswanathan, 
How to Define Illegal Price Manipulation, 98 AM. ECON. REV. PAP. & PROC. 274, 274 (2008), 
and the well-known critique of the possibility of profitable market manipulation, Daniel R. 
Fischel & David Ross, Should the Law Prohibit “Manipulation” in Financial Markets?, 105 
HARV. L. REV. 503 (1991). 
646 This confusion as to what manipulation is and when it might be unlawful is at least in part a 
legacy of the Supreme Court’s repeated emphasis on fraud and deceit in interpreting § 10(b). 
See, e.g., Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 198 (1976) (“the word ‘manipulative’ . . . is 
and was virtually a term of art when used in connection with securities markets. It connotes 
intentional or willful conduct designed to deceive or defraud investors by controlling or 
artificially affecting the price of securities.”) (citations omitted); Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. 
Green, 430 U.S. 462, 476 (1977) (manipulation “refers generally to practices, such as wash sales, 
matched orders, or rigged prices, that are intended to mislead investors by artificially affecting 
market activity.”); Schreiber v. Burlington Northern, Inc., 472 U.S. 1, 8 n.6 (1985); Chiarella v. 
United States, 445 U.S. 222, 234-35 (1980). 
647 Louisiana Corp. v. Merrill Lynch & Co., 571 F. App’x 8, 10 (2d Cir. 2014) (discussing the 
general elements of an open market manipulation claim), citing ATSI Commc’ns, Inc. v. Shaar 
Fund, Ltd., 493 F.3d 87, 101 (2d Cir. 2007).  
648 GFL Advantage Fund, Ltd. v. Colkitt, 272 F.3d 189, 205 (3d Cir. 2001) (“the essential 
element of the [market manipulation] claim is that inaccurate information is being injected into 
the marketplace.”); Foss v. Bear, Stearns & Co., 394 F.3d 540, 541 (7th Cir. 2005) (“There is no 
violation of Section 10(b) without fraud”). 
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On the other side, are the D.C. Circuit,649 and as of 2015, the Second Circuit,650 holding 
that lawful trading alone, when done with the wrong intent, can be a form of market 
manipulation prohibited by § 10(b). This split was the subject of a petition to the Supreme Court 
in 2016.651 More scholarly attention is merited in assessing how the law should address 
manipulation. 
5.3 Short Selling 
Short selling is a trading practice in which a trader borrows a security from a third party, 
sells that security, and later “covers” by acquiring an identical security and returning it to the 
third party.652 While short selling has been intermittently controversial, especially during times 
of financial crisis, it is generally permitted, although scrutinized, by current regulation, and there 
appears to be widespread academic support for this position.653  
6 Current Issues in Equity Market Structure 
On high-level measures of liquidity and transaction costs, the U.S. equity markets are 
remarkably healthy. Commissions and spreads have dropped dramatically in the past two 
decades.654 Retail investors can trade conveniently online for commissions of $10 per trade (10 
cents per share for a round lot) or less. 
At a more detailed level, however, several recent equity market developments have 
generated criticism and concern. The number of trading venues has proliferated. The structural 
                                                 
649 Markowski v. S.E.C., 274 F.3d 525, 528-29 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (interpreting Congress, through 
Section 9(a)(2) of the Securities Exchange Act, to have proscribed manipulations exclusively 
involving trades based “solely because of the actor’s purpose” when that purpose was improper, 
without necessitating any further unlawful act). 
650 Fezzani v. Bear, Stearns & Co. Inc., 777 F.3d 566, 571 (2d Cir. 2015) (Section 10(b) does not 
require “reliance by a victim on direct oral or written communications by a defendant.”). 
651 Koch v. SEC, No. 15-781 (S. Ct. Mar. 28, 2016). 
652 There are a number of short selling structures, not all of which involve borrowing a security.  
653 Regulation SHO and Rule 10a-1, Securities Exchange Act Release No. 34-55970, 72 Fed. 
Reg. 36,348 (July 3, 2007) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 242); see also Exchange Act Release 
No. 50103 (July 28, 2004), 69 Fed. Reg. 48008, 48011 (Aug. 6, 2004); see also Exchange Act 
Release No. 48795 (Nov. 17, 2003), 68 Fed. Reg. 65820 (Nov. 21, 2003). 
654 See James J. Angel, Lawrence E. Harris & Chester S. Spatt, Equity Trading in the 21st 
Century: An Update, 5 Q. J. FIN. 1 (2015) (documenting improvements in speed of execution, 
bid-ask spread, commissions, and number of quotes per minute); see also Angel, Harris & Spatt, 
supra note 370. 
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and functional differences among them have diminished, but the regulatory system continues to 
treat exchanges, ATSs, and broker-dealer internalization differently. Registered exchanges and 
ATSs both operate automated matching systems. Competition among trading venues has led 
most to adopt pricing structures designed to attract order flow. It does not make obvious sense 
for trading platforms offering similar services using similar technologies and matching 
procedures to fit into different regulatory boxes. 
Another important question is whether trading venues’ pricing structures lead brokers to 
provide less than optimal executions for their customers. There are two dominant pricing models, 
described in more detail below, that provide brokers a financial incentive to execute orders in a 
particular market. 
The trading practices of securities professionals are another source of concern. The 
replacement of traditional manual markets by automated matching engines has, as commentators 
expected, reduced the number and importance of traditional specialists and market makers. But 
contrary to some expectations, it has not resulted in a market in which long-term investors’ 
trades are mostly made directly with one another. Instead, so-called high-frequency traders 
(HFTs) have stepped in as an important category of liquidity provider.  
In this section, we explore each of these structural issues. 
6.1 Venue Types 
6.1.1 Regulatory Categories 
All exchanges and most other organized trading venues now operate electronic limit 
order books that automatically match marketable and nonmarketable order flow. However, for 
regulatory purposes, these trading venues are put into separate buckets labeled “exchange,” 
“ATS,” or “broker-dealer internalization.” These distinctions were initially driven by the need to 
accommodate new electronic trading venues that neither maintained the volume, nor regulated 
their members in a manner reminiscent of, a traditional exchange. The technological differences, 
however, have largely disappeared and the operational differences are becoming blurred. Broker-
dealer trading platforms may mimic the exchanges’ matching procedures. Exchanges offer a 
variety of order types that can mimic the way a broker-dealer traditionally “works” a large order. 
As a result of these technological and operational developments, the governing regulatory 
regime is largely a choice variable for the trading venue. BATS began operation as an ATS but 
converted to a registered exchange. Citadel Execution Services, an automated trading system that 
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is one of the largest trading venues for retail orders, has chosen to be regulated as a broker-dealer 
that internalizes order flow and not as an ATS. 
The choice whether to be an exchange, an ATS, or a broker-dealer has a number of 
consequences: 
 exchanges engage in market surveillance and otherwise regulate their members; ATSs do 
not655 
 unlike an ATS, the rules of an exchange must meet a public interest standard and changes 
to those rules are subject to SEC approval656 
 exchanges must make membership available to any registered broker-dealer; ATSs are 
subject to the fair access requirement only if they exceed the 5% trading volume 
threshold; broker-dealers may offer to internalize an order or not at their discretion 
 exchange quotations are included in the consolidated quotation system, whereas ATSs 
may choose to include their quotations or not unless they exceed the 5% trading volume 
threshold and broker-dealers need not publicly display the prices at which they intend to 
internalize orders. 
The difference between an exchange, an ATS, and a broker-dealer is in part a difference 
in the rules of internal governance that provide the terms of explicit and implicit contracts 
between the trading venue and its members or customers. In that respect, the choice to be one 
type of regulated entity or another is analogous to a business’s choice to be a corporation, a 
partnership, or an LLC. While legislators or regulators provide the menu of options, they have 
little reason to care which one a particular trading venue selects. 
However, the choice of regulatory type has external effects as well. Most notably, it 
affects other market participants’ access to quotations. While insisting on linked markets, 
Congress and the SEC have permitted a degree of competition among different trading platforms 
with respect to transparency and order types. An important question for a new special study is 
whether to rethink the regulatory categories. 
6.1.2 Liability Rules 
                                                 
655 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78f(a), 78c(a)(26); Lanier v. Bats Exch., Inc., 838 F.3d 139 (2d Cir. 2016). 
656 15 U.S.C. § 78f(b). 
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Distinctive liability rules currently apply to different kinds of trading venues. Broker-
dealers, whether internalizers or ATSs, are subject to the same liability rules as any other private 
financial institution. In contrast, exchanges and their officers enjoy “absolute immunity” from 
suits for monetary damages when they are acting pursuant to their regulatory and oversight 
functions as self-regulatory organizations.657 The policy and legal foundation for this immunity 
is that as SROs, the exchanges perform regulatory functions that would otherwise be performed 
by the SEC—an agency afforded sovereign immunity from any monetary liability.658 As a result, 
an exchange is immune to suits for fraud, incompetence, or other forms of misconduct when 
engaged in interpretation, discipline, or enforcement, or other activities necessary or critical to its 
quasi-governmental regulatory functions.659 
The sharp discontinuity between the regulatory burdens and immunity benefits of 
exchange status and the burdens and liabilities of ATSs highlights the importance of revisiting 
whether the current structure for categorizing trading venues makes sense. Does immunity from 
liability still make sense for SROs, at least when read as broadly as it is by, for example, the 
Second Circuit? Does the lack of regulatory scrutiny applied to internalizers, like Citadel, make 
sense given that their share of equity market volume exceeds that of many exchanges and any 
ATS?  
                                                 
657 A “self-regulatory organization ‘when acting in its capacity as a SRO, is entitled to immunity 
from suit when it engages in conduct consistent with the quasi-governmental powers delegated to 
it pursuant to the Exchange Act and the regulations and rules promulgated thereunder.’” DL 
Capital Grp., LLC v. Nasdaq Stock Mkt., Inc., 409 F.3d 93, 97 (2d Cir. 2005) (citations omitted), 
citing D’Alessio v. N.Y. Stock Exch., Inc., 258 F.3d 93, 106 (2d Cir. 2001); Barbara v. N.Y. 
Stock Exch., Inc., 99 F.3d 49, 59 (2d Cir. 1996) abrogated on other grounds by Merrill Lynch, 
Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc. v. Manning, 136 S. Ct. 1562 (2016); Weissman v. Nat’l Ass’n of 
Sec. Dealers, Inc., 500 F.3d 1293, 1296 (11th Cir. 2007) (“SROs are protected by absolute 
immunity when they perform their statutorily delegated adjudicatory, regulatory, and 
prosecutorial functions”); Sparta Surgical Corp. v. Nat’l Ass’n of Sec. Dealers, Inc., 159 F.3d 
1209, 1214 (9th Cir. 1998); Austin Mun. Sec., Inc. v. Nat’l Ass’n of Sec. Dealers, Inc., 757 F.2d 
676, 692 (5th Cir. 1985) (“the NASD . . . requires absolute immunity from civil liability for 
actions connected with the disciplining of its members.”) (citations omitted). 
658 DL Capital, 409 F.3d at 97; id. (“the NYSE should, in light of its ‘special status and 
connection to the SEC,’ out of fairness be accorded full immunity from suits for money 
damages, as well.”); id. (when “alleged misconduct falls within the scope of quasi-governmental 
powers delegated to the NYSE pursuant to the Exchange Act . . . absolute immunity precludes 
[any plaintiff] from recovering money damages in connection with his claims.”). 
659 Id. at 98-99. 
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6.2 Broker-Dealer Routing Decisions 
Broker-dealers are pivotal actors in the equity marketplace. The term “broker-dealer” is a 
regulatory status created pursuant to the Exchange Act. The SEC mandates that any individual or 
institution that acts as either a broker or dealer register as a “broker-dealer” with Form BD.660 A 
broker is defined as “any person engaged in the business of effecting transactions in securities 
for the account of others,” and a dealer as “any person engaged in the business of buying and 
selling securities . . . for such person’s own account through a broker or otherwise.”661 While 
capacious, these definitions are expressly crafted to exclude investors who simply actively trade 
equities, while capturing those participants whose business is intermediating trade, whether as 
principal or agent. 
6.2.1 The Duty of Best Execution 
The main legal framework relevant for assessing agency functions of broker-dealers, such 
as handling the execution of customer orders, is the duty of best execution. Brokers owe 
customers a duty of best execution as a matter of state common law, self-regulatory organization 
rules, and arguably federal securities law. The seminal discussion of best execution is Newton v. 
Merrill Lynch,662 a class action stemming from the Nasdaq odd-eighths scandal. As defined by 
the Newton court, the duty of best execution “requires a broker-dealer to ‘use reasonable efforts 
to maximize the economic benefit to the client in each transaction.’”663 This duty is multi-
dimensional, requiring a broker to take into account best price, but also “order size, trading 
characteristics of the security, speed of execution, clearing costs, and the cost and difficulty of 
executing an order in a particular market.” 664 
FINRA Rule 5310 similarly defines a broad standard, requiring a broker to use 
reasonable diligence to ascertain the best market for a security in any transaction for or with a 
                                                 
660 See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 15(b); 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b). 
661 See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 §§ 3(4)(A), 3(5)(A), 15 U.S.C. § 78c. 
662 Newton v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 259 F.3d 154, 162 (3d Cir. 2001) 
(hereinafter Newton II), as amended (Oct. 16, 2001); Newton v. Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & 
Smith, Inc., 135 F.3d 266, 271 (3d Cir. 1998) (hereinafter Newton I). 
663 Newton II at 173. 
664 Newton I at 271. For a more recent opinion fundamentally applying the analysis of Newton, 
see Gurfein v. Ameritrade, Inc., No. 04 CIV. 9526(LLS), 2007 WL 2049771, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. 
July 17, 2007), aff’d, 312 F. App’x 410 (2d Cir. 2009). 
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customer, and to provide an execution such that the resultant price for the customer is “as 
favorable as possible under prevailing market conditions.”665 Reasonable diligence includes 
considering: “the character of the market for the security (e.g., price, volatility, relative liquidity, 
and pressure on available communications)”; “the size and type of transaction”; “the number of 
markets checked”; the “accessibility of the quotation”; and “the terms and conditions of the order 
which result in the transaction.”666 
Perhaps because of the standard’s complexity, the SEC has opted for a combined “rules 
and standards” approach. As described above, the best execution standard applicable to 
brokerage executions is supplemented by Rule 611 of Regulation NMS, the trade-through rule, 
which is in part designed to provide a minimum floor for “best price” execution for small 
orders.667 The broader “best execution” standard does most of the work regulating the execution 
of larger and more complicated orders and strategies. 
Although Rule 611 forces brokers to recognize price priority across markets, it does not 
recognize time (or any other non-price) priority across markets. Thus, when multiple markets 
display the same best bid or offer, a broker can route a customer order to any one of those 
venues. It can also route the order to a venue that does not display quotations, so long as that 
venue executes the trade at the NBBO or better. Trading venues attempt to influence this 
exercise of discretion through their pricing systems. There are two common pricing practices: 
“maker-taker” fees and “payment for order flow.” From the perspective of a retail investor, the 
first is relevant primarily to non-marketable limit orders and the second to marketable orders, as 
will be explained below. 
6.2.2 Maker-Taker Fees 
In a maker-taker model, a trading venue pays a rebate for each non-marketable limit 
order posted to it that executes on the venue. The theory is that the trader who submitted a 
resting limit order added liquidity to the trading venue. The subsequent trader who “takes” that 
liquidity by submitting a contra-side marketable order pays a fee that is typically slightly larger 
than the liquidity rebate, with the difference representing revenue to the exchange. This is a 
common fee structure on ATSs and exchanges, although some have experimented with an 
                                                 
665 FINRA Rule 5310 “Best Execution and Interpositioning.” (emphasis added). 
666 Id. at Rule 5310(a)(1)(A)-(E). 
667 See infra subsection 4.3.2. 
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inverted “taker-maker” fee structure.668 Rule 610(c) of Regulation NMS caps the “take” fee at 
$0.003/share to the extent the resting order is a protected order or the best bid or offer in a 
displayed market. 
Brokers do not typically pass along the liquidity rebate directly to retail customers who 
submit non-marketable limit orders.669 There is evidence that the rebates lead brokers to send 
those orders to venues that may be inferior with respect to fill rates and other indicia of execution 
quality.670 It is more difficult to determine whether competition leads brokers to pass on the 
resulting revenue to customers in the form of lower commissions. In any event, the SEC’s 
position is clear that these maker-taker fee structures are legally permissible and that broker-
dealers do not necessarily violate their fiduciary duties simply by directing orders to such 
venues. 
A separate concern with this fee structure is that it adds a layer of complexity for traders 
attempting to determine the best available price.671 Displayed prices do not reflect the actual 
price paid or received net of the rebate or fee. Regulation NMS defines the “best” bid or offer 
without reference to the actual cost of accessing that bid or offer. 
6.2.3 Payment for Order Flow 
Dealers who internalize orders often pay third party brokers to direct orders to them for 
execution rather than to an exchange or ATS, a practice known as “payment for order flow” 
(PFOF).672 As part of the arrangement, the internalizer typically commits to execute trades at a 
                                                 
668 Inverted “taker-maker” fee arrangements impose the opposite fee structure on incoming 
orders. Typically, maker-taker arrangements award $.0020-$.0025 per share for executed 
nonmarketable orders and charge $.0025-$.0030 per share for executed marketable orders. These 
arrangements must be publicly available on an exchange’s website. See Securities Exchange Act 
of 1934 § 19(b)(3)(A)(ii)(4), 15 U.S.C. § 78s(b)(3)(A)(ii) (2012); 17 C.F.R. § 240.19b-4(f)(2) 
(2013). 
669 See Larry E. Harris, Maker-Taker Pricing Effects on Market Quotations (working paper 
2013). 
670 See Robert Battalio, Shane A. Corwin & Robert Jennings, Can Brokers Have It All? On the 
Relation Between Make-Take Fees and Limit Order Execution Quality, 71 J. FIN. 2193 (2016).  
671 See SEC Market Structure Advisory Committee, Maker-Taker Fees on Equities Exchanges, 
https://www.sec.gov/spotlight/emsac/memo-maker-taker-fees-on-equities-exchanges.pdf. 




price that is at least a slight improvement over the NBBO.673 The broker can therefore argue that 
it has met its best execution obligation to the customer while pocketing the incentive payment 
from the dealer, an argument the SEC has accepted.674 
Retail customer orders are extremely desirable because they are assumed to be 
uninformed and therefore to create no adverse selection risk for the dealer. Accordingly, retail 
brokers route nearly all of their customer market orders to internalizers pursuant to PFOF 
arrangements.675  Payments to large retail brokerages for order flow in 2014 ranged from $92 
million to $304 million, with the rate per share ranging from $0.0010 to $0.0031.676   
A small number of firms dominate internalization, with Citadel, KCG Americas, and G1 
accounting for around 28%, 20%, and 10% of non-ATS OTC volume and the ten largest non-
ATS venues accounting for over 80% of volume.677 This means that by parent company, Citadel 
and KCG are some of the largest execution forums for U.S. equities, after the NYSE, BATS, and 
Nasdaq exchange groups.678 
Although brokers receive the PFOF, competition among brokers should lead them to 
reduce retail commissions to attract more customers in order to have more retail orders to sell. 
Certainly the level of retail commissions has declined in recent years. At least one online broker 
                                                 
673 Id. at 6. 
674 See Payment for Order Flow Proposing Release, Securities Exchange Act Release No. 33026 
(Oct. 7, 1993) 58 Fed. Reg. 52934, 52936 (Oct. 13, 1993) (“Payment for Order Flow Proposing 
Release”). The principal regulatory strategy toward PFOF has been disclosure. Id. at 59 FR 
55006. For an overview of the relevant distinct disclosure requirements, see 17 CFR 240.10b-10; 
17 CFR 240.606; and 17 CFR 240.607(a)(1)-(2). 
675 SEC, Certain Issues Affecting Customers in the Current Equity Market Structure, Jan. 26, 
2016, at 2 n.2 (“Internalization is believed to account for almost 100% of all retail marketable 
order flow.”) 
676 Id. at 6. 
677 All statistics are derived from data from FINRA’s OTC Transparency Data facility. See OTC 
Transparency Data, https://otctransparency.finra.org/ (calculations for the months of September 
2016 and April 2017). 
678 Data on exchange volume in U.S. equities is available on BATS’s website. See U.S. Equities 




has taken advantage of PFOF (among other revenue sources) to offer commission-free trading.679 
Empirically, the effects of PFOF, like maker-taker fees, on customer welfare is a topic for further 
study. 
Internalization is controversial apart from concerns about retail brokerage customers.680 
Dealers’ willingness to internalize is another form of non-displayed liquidity that has attracted 
the same criticism as dark pools and non-displayed order types. A separate criticism is that 
internalizers “skim” the uninformed (usually retail) order flow. Thus, the relative proportion of 
informed order flow arriving at the primary exchanges, where price discovery takes place, is 
necessarily greater than would be the case absent internalization and PFOF.681 
Because market makers respond to adverse selection risk by increasing the bid-ask 
spread, PFOF might cause an increase in market-wide spreads. The counterargument is that the 
aggregate amount of adverse selection risk that liquidity providers face should not depend on 
how it is distributed. It is always in the best interests of retail investors to have a separating 
equilibrium where the lit markets have all the informed traders and wider spreads to compensate, 
while retail investors trade exclusively OTC with dealers inside the spread. Thus, it is again an 
empirical question whether concentrating adverse selection risk in the lit markets has adverse 
welfare consequences. 
The SEC has suggested that it might consider a “trade at” rule that would prohibit a 
trading center from executing an order at the NBBO unless it was already displaying that price 
when the order arrived.682 The rule would reduce broker discretion over order routing, 
particularly to internalizers. But it would also have significant distributional consequences for 
trading venues. The requirement that the venue “display” the NBBO would mean that dark ATSs 
and internalizers would always have to price improve in order to execute a trade. The rule would 
                                                 
679 See, e.g., http://www.robinhood.com; see also Jane Morrissey, With No Frills and No 
Commissions, Robinhood App Takes On Big Brokerages, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 18, 2017, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/18/business/robinhood-stock-trading-app.html.  
680 For a sample of important analyses, see, e.g., Allen Ferrell, A Proposal for Solving the 
“Payment for Order Flow” Problem, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 1027 (2001); John C. Coffee, Jr., 
Order-Flow Payments Get New Scrutiny, NAT’L L.J., July 19, 1993. 
681 See Beny, supra note 589, at 432-33 (discussing empirical evidence addressing whether 
internalization has actually increased the proportion of informed trade on exchanges). 
682 See Market Structure Release, supra note 549, at 70. 
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accordingly have to define a “meaningful” price improvement in order to prevent internalizers 
from “stepping ahead” of the NBBO by trivial amounts. Not surprisingly, the concept of a trade 
at rule is popular among lit venues and unpopular among dark venues. It is also unpopular 
among large traders, who fear that being forced into lit venues would increase the price impact of 
their trades. 
An alternative approach to addressing PFOF is for regulators to clarify the requirements 
of best execution. FINRA’s recent best execution guidance provides that the duty applies to a 
FINRA member executing transactions as principal where the member accepts order flow “for 
the purpose of facilitating the handling and execution of such orders,” but not where “the 
member is acting solely as the buyer or seller in connection with orders presented by a broker-
dealer against the member’s quote.”683 This guidance plausibly requires that broker-dealers 
paying for order flow are under a duty of best execution when transacting with that order flow.684 
The SEC and/or FINRA may wish to provide further guidance as to how that duty of best 
execution applies to an internalizer’s order routing decisions.  
6.2.4 Dark Pool Agency Problems 
A significant portion of executed volume involves non-displayed orders. Dark pools, like 
broker-dealer internalization, raise concerns about whether uninformed order flow is 
overwhelmingly being executed off-exchange, resulting in higher spreads on exchanges due to 
correspondingly greater adverse selection concerns. Dark pools raise other concerns as well. 
Large broker-dealer firms run many of the high-volume dark pools, creating a potential 
agency problem. The broker has an interest in routing orders to its own dark pool, both because it 
receives execution fees and because it may offer its own trading desk or other favored traders 
opportunities to transact with its customer orders. These interests may conflict with the 
customer’s interest in best execution. At least one recent settlement suggests that these conflicts 
of interest may have led a dark pool operator to put its own interests ahead of its customers. Two 
                                                 
683 FINRA Rule 5310 Supplementary Material .04. 
684 See also FINRA Regulatory Notice 15-46 Best Execution: Guidance on Best Execution 
Obligations in Equity, Options and Fixed Income Markets 3 (2015) (firms “cannot transfer to 
another person their obligations to provide best execution to their customers’ orders, although 
other firms may also acquire that best execution obligation.... [A] broker-dealer that routes all of 
its order flow to another broker-dealer without conducting an independent review of execution 
quality would violate the duty of best execution.”). 
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other settlements involve dark pools that made material misrepresentations to customers in 
marketing materials. In aggregate, Credit Suisse, Barclays Capital, and Deutsche Bank were 
fined over $200 million for violations of the Exchange Act in connection with their dark pools. 
At various times, these firms operated the first, second, and fourth largest equity ATSs, 
respectively.685  
Credit Suisse owns and operates the dark pool Crossfinder. The Commission found that 
Crossfinder communicated confidential subscriber trading information to affiliated entities.686 
This violated Rule 301(b)(10) of Reg. ATS, which requires protection of confidential trading 
information. The ATS adopting release also stated that brokers should separate their ATS and 
brokerage functions.687 More importantly, the Commission found that Credit Suisse 
misrepresented to clients that its smart order router did not preference Crossfinder (or any other 
venue) although the router systematically privileged Crossfinder.688 In particular, certain router 
default settings automatically routed orders to Crossfinder. 
Barclays admitted making material misrepresentations in marketing and operating its 
dark pool, Barclays LX (“LX”).689 In particular, Barclays misrepresented LX’s Liquidity 
Profiling function and its related surveillance tools for policing LX trading activity.690 Liquidity 
Profiling was a program designed to categorize LX users as more or less aggressive depending 
on particular aspects of their order flow and then to allow users generally to block the most 
                                                 
685 In the Matter of Barclays Capital Inc., Securities Exchange Act Release No. 77001, 
https://www.sec.gov/-litigation/admin/2016/33-10010.pdf (hereinafter Barclays Order); In the 
Matter of Credit Suisse Securities (USA) LLC, Securities Exchange Act Release No. 77002, 
https://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2016/33-10013.pdf (hereinafter Credit Suisse Order); In 
the Matter of Deutsche Bank Securities Inc., Securities Exchange Act Release No. 79576, 
https://www.sec.gov/litigation/-admin/2016/33-10272.pdf (hereinafter Deutsche Bank Order). 
686 Credit Suisse Order, supra note 504. Credit Suisse neither admitted nor denied the findings in 
the Commission’s Order. Id. at 1. Crossfinder also violated the subpenny quote prohibition, see 
infra subsection 4.3.2, by permitting customers to submit almost 500 million orders at subpenny 
prices. 
687 17 C.F.R. § 242.301(b)(10); ATS Adopting Release at 70879. 
688 Credit Suisse Order, supra note 685, at 11. 
689 Barclays Order, supra note 685. 
690 Id. at 3-5. Barclays also misrepresented to customers that it relied on market data feeds 
generally to calculate its internal NBBO, while it relied on a combination of the SIP and direct 
feeds from some exchanges, but not NYSE.  
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aggressive traders from interacting with them. In fact, Barclays conducted very little surveillance 
of LX trading activity and would sometimes override the Liquidity Profiling tool’s categorization 
of participants, including manually moving users from the most to the least aggressive 
categories. This resulted in other users trading with them after having opted to block such trades.  
The action against Deutsche Bank (“DB”)involves a possibly inadvertent failure to 
operate its order router in the manner it represented to customers.691 DB developed an order 
router, SuperX+, primarily for routing equity orders to dark pools. DB marketed SuperX+ as 
based on a routing algorithm called the “Dark Pool Ranking Model” (“DPRM”), which was 
described as SuperX+’s “quantitative core.” DPRM was designed to rank venues based on 
execution quality, and then to route orders to eligible venues that historically had offered the best 
liquidity. However, SuperX+ largely failed to update DPRM due to a coding error, and DB’s 
personnel sometimes supplemented DPRM with their subjective assessments. DB’s marketing 
materials accordingly failed to reflect the actual operation of SuperX+. 
6.3 High-Frequency Trading 
HFTs are proprietary trading firms or desks that enter and cancel orders and make trades 
in high volume and at great speed.692 Like traditional market makers, they seek to earn a spread 
on their trades, but not to establish large long or short positions. Unlike traditional market 
makers, they need have no formal connection to the market and no corresponding obligation to 
quote continuous prices or smooth order imbalances. However, many HFTs have taken on 
institutional market making roles at exchanges. For instance, prominent HFTs, such as Virtu, 
                                                 
691 Deutsche Bank Order, supra note 685. That DB’s errors were largely inadvertent is 
underlined by the fact that due to a coding error, its own dark pool was erroneously placed 
among the worst venues by its algorithm, which rendered the venue incapable of receiving 
almost any orders. Id. at 4. Subsequently, Deutsche Bank manually overrode the ranking and 
placed its dark pool in the highest ranking. 
692 For a review of recent academic research on high-frequency trading, see Charles M. Jones, 
What Do We Know About High-Frequency Trading 10, 26 (Columbia Business School Research 
Paper, Paper No. 13-11, 2013). 
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Citadel, and GTS are among the few Designated Market Makers (DMM) at NYSE.693 HFTs have 
become an important class of market professional.694 
Although there is no single accepted definition of HFTs, they are typically described as 
using high-speed communications, private data feeds from trading venues, and algorithmic 
trading strategies to rapidly and frequently enter, cancel, and update quotations at trading 
venues.695 As a result, they play substantial roles in both market making and arbitrage activities. 
Research indicates that they supply a majority of the limit orders against which marketable 
orders transact.696 
HFTs argue that they face the same challenges as traditional market makers—to earn a 
spread on as many trades as possible while managing adverse selection and inventory risk. 
Because they do so in a highly dispersed electronic market, they necessarily use algorithms 
rather than the continuous manual updating of quotations that characterized traditional market 
makers. Critics claim that they exploit their speed advantage over other traders to earn nearly 
riskless profits through superior access to information about transactions and quotations. We will 
examine some of the practices that have generated criticism. 
6.3.1 Latency Arbitrage 
Media commentators, industry insiders, and academics all worry about the prevalence of 
“latency arbitrage” by HFTs. The term refers to a family of trading practices that can differ 
considerably in their economics, riskiness, and desirability from a welfare standpoint, but all use 
                                                 
693 NYSE Membership, NYSE Designated Market Maker Firms, 
https://www.nyse.com/markets/nyse/membership. 
694 Another fact suggestive of HFTs’ increasing prominence is GTS’s purchase of Barclay’s 
DMM business at NYSE. With this development, all NYSE DMMs are now operated by 
automated, algorithmic trading firms, which have crowded out all of the traditional brokerages 
that were once common market makers. See NYSE Membership, Designated Market Makers, 
https://www.nyse.com/markets/nyse/membership; see also Annie Massa, High-Speed Firms Now 
Oversee Almost All Stocks at NYSE Floor, BLOOMBERG, Jan. 26, 2016. 
695 See Charles R. Korsmo, High-Frequency Trading: A Regulatory Strategy, 48 U. RICH. L. 
REV. 523, 540 (2014) (defining attributes of HFTs). 
696 Jonathan A. Brogaard, High Frequency Trading and its Impact on Market Quality 2, 11 (July 
16, 2010) (unpublished manuscript), http://www.futuresindustry.org/ptg/downloads/HFT_
Trading.pdf (finding HFTs supply limit orders for 51% of trades and provide market quotes 50% 
of the time, based on NASDAQ data set); see generally Albert J. Menkveld, High Frequency 
Trading and the New Market Makers, 16 J. FIN. MKTS. 712 (2013). 
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information asymmetries generated by speed differences to exploit potential profit-making 
opportunities.697 We will briefly consider three different types. 
The first is inter-venue order cancellation, or simply “order cancellation” as we will refer 
to it.698 The term refers to a liquidity provider cancelling quotes for a given security at one or 
more venues on which it has posted orders after detecting trading activity at another venue or 
venues. In a highly competitive market, inter-venue order cancellation is to be expected and is 
unlikely to be problematic.699 Quote removal often represents defensive risk management by 
liquidity providers. They may be concerned that large transactions on one venue are 
informationally motivated and that current orders posted on other venues thus face a significant 
adverse selection risk.700 Alternatively, they may accumulate positions in one market and 
therefore need to quote less aggressively in another. 
Lewis identifies two other forms of latency arbitrage and argues that they are ethically 
similar to front-running, or the improper use of information about another trader’s intentions. In 
traditional forms of front-running, the use is improper because the trader owes a duty to the 
source of the information, as when a broker or investment advisor trades ahead of a large 
customer order. That is not the case with latency arbitrage. Instead, the use is argued to be 
improper because the HFT obtains information about changes in quotations or last-transaction 
prices through a private data feed more rapidly than other traders. 
“Slow market arbitrage” involves an HFT with a limit order at the NBB or NBO on one 
exchange which then learns of a new quote at another venue that improves on that quote. If a 
                                                 
697 Robert P. Bartlett, III & Justin McCrary, How Rigged Are Stock Markets? Evidence from 
Microsecond Timestamps (working paper, Aug. 5, 2016). 
698 See Vincent van Kervel, Liquidity: What You See Is What You Get?, 2–6 (May 2012) 
(unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Tilburg University), 
http://www.rsm.nl/fileadmin/home/Department_of_Finance__VG5_/LQ5/VanKervel.pdf. 
Michael Lewis refers to inter-venue order cancelation as “electronic front-running” in Flash 
Boys. See Lewis, supra note 373. The nomenclature of “slow market arbitrage” and “midpoint 
order exploitation” are similarly taken from Lewis’s book. 
699 See van Kervel, supra note 698 (showing that trades on venues are followed by cancellations 
of limit orders on competing venues and would be expected based on adverse selection 
dynamics). 
700 Under non-competitive market dynamics, the possibility of a liquidity provider canceling its 
quotes and replacing them with quotes providing marketable orders with inferior executions may 
represent a socially undesirable increase in transaction costs for traders. 
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marketable order then arrives at the first venue and transacts against the HFT’s now-stale quote, 
that HFT could make a riskless profit by transacting against the improved quote standing on the 
alternative venue (if it is still there). 
“Midpoint order exploitation” involves a “midpoint” limit order resting on a dark pool 
that will transact against the next incoming marketable contra-side order at the current midpoint 
of the NBBO. An HFT could potentially detect a quote improving on the current NBB or NBO at 
a lit venue and then rapidly transact with that improving quote, while sending an opposite order 
to a dark pool with a contra-side midpoint limit order still based on the stale NBB/NBO, 
resulting in riskless profit (if there was such an order). So-called slow market arbitrage and 
midpoint order exploitation both depend on the same reality, which is an order transacting 
against (or being based on) a kind of “stale quote” – a quote that was, but no longer is, the best 
bid or offer. 
6.3.2 Latency Arbitrage and Regulation NMS 
The NBBO as defined for regulatory purposes consists of the best quotations 
disseminated by the SIP. Trading venues provide their quotations to the SIP pursuant to a 
national market system plan. At the same time, they offer private feeds of the same data to 
market participants willing to pay for the private link. Co-location, or putting the market 
professional’s servers in close physical proximity to the exchange’s servers, assures the 
minimum possible delay in receipt of the data. Traders can use this data to privately construct the 
NBBO some milliseconds before the NBBO is available from the SIP.701 
A trader can exploit the resulting time difference because of the SEC’s interpretation of 
Rule 603(a)(2) of Regulation NMS. The rule prohibits exchanges from “unreasonably 
discriminatory” distribution of market data.702 The SEC’s interpretation of the provision has been 
that “distributed data could not be made available on a more timely basis [to private clients] than 
core data is made available to a Network processor [the SIP].”703 Thus, “Rule 603(a) prohibits an 
                                                 
701 See Market Structure Release, supra note 549. 
702 See 17 C.F.R. § 242.603(a)(2) (2015). Section 11A(c)(1) of the Exchange Act authorizes the 
Commission to regulate market data. 15 U.S.C. § 78k-1(b) (2012). 
703 See Regulation NMS, 70 Fed. Reg. 37,496, 37,567 & 37,569 (June 29, 2005) (adopting 
release for Regulation NMS). 
267 
 
SRO or broker-dealer from transmitting data to a vendor or user any sooner than it transmits the 
data to a Network processor.”704 
In short, the SEC’s interpretation of “unreasonably discriminatory” is based on when the 
market center sends a signal, not when traders actually receive it. Traders who get core data from 
the SIP will generally receive it with a slight delay compared to those who get it directly from 
the trading center even though the trading center sends them to private clients and the SIP 
simultaneously. The usefulness of private data feeds and co-location is partly predicated on this 
interpretation.705 
Critics dispute the SEC’s interpretation of Rule 603(a)(2), arguing that the simultaneous 
distribution of information to private data feeds and the SIP—knowing private data feeds will 
arrive before the SIP’s data—is “unreasonably discriminatory.”706 They offer an alternative 
interpretation under which it would be “unreasonably discriminatory” to send a signal that will 
reach private customers before the SIP core data are publicly available.707 The SEC has adopted 
analogous interpretations, emphasizing when information reaches end users rather than the time 
it is sent, in other contexts, including for when information is no longer nonpublic for insider 
trading purposes.708 
There is a tension with the principle behind the trade-through rule when a trader can 
execute a trade at a particular price knowing that in a millisecond or so the SIP may show that it 
is no longer the best available price. However, Rule 611(b)(8) of Regulation NMS permits a 
trade-through when “[t]he trading center displaying the protected quotation that was traded 
through had displayed, within one second prior to execution of the transaction that constituted 
                                                 
704 Id. 
705 In fact, the Market Structure Release, supra note 549, at 3601, confirmed this interpretation 
by acknowledging these arrangements. Id. (consolidation processing time of the SIP “means that 
[private] data feeds can reach end-users faster than the consolidated data feeds.”). 
706 See Direct vs. SIP Data Feed, Nanex (Apr. 4, 2014), http://www.nanex.net/aqck2/4599.html. 
707 For instance, the market research firm Nanex views exchange private data feeds as violating 
Regulation NMS. See HFT Front Running, All The Time, Nanex (Sept. 30, 2013), http://
www.nanex.net/aqck2/4442.html. 
708 See, e.g., SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d 833, 854 (2d Cir. 1968); Investors Mgmt. Co., 
Exchange Act Release No. 9207, 1971 WL 120502, at *8 (July 29, 1971). 
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the trade-through, a best bid or best offer, as applicable, for the NMS stock with a price that was 
equal or inferior to the price of the trade-through transaction.”709 
Put simply, a trading venue may permit an order to transact against a quote that is no 
longer best if the now-best quote is on a venue which, within one second prior, had displayed as 
its best bid or offer a price equal or inferior to the price of the transaction.710 A new, price-
improving quote thus only becomes protected after being in force for one second, far more time 
than trading venues generally need to register a new quote at another venue and update their own 
systems accordingly. 
From a customer welfare perspective, the question is whether venues deliberately use the 
one-second exception to attract HFTs with risk-free profits at the cost of providing customers 
inferior executions. This is in principle subject to empirical testing. If trading venues allow HFTs 
to use the one second exception to execute trades at stale prices, there should be many 
transactions occurring “outside the quote,” or inferior to the best available prices in the market. 
To gain a sense of their magnitude, one would analyze how often trades occur on trading venues 
at prices that were outside the best quote for that security at the time of trade.711 A breakdown of 
                                                 
709 17 C.F.R. § 242.611(b)(8). 
710 See also Regulation NMS, 70 Fed. Reg. 37,496, 37,522 (June 29, 2005) (adopting release for 
Reg. NMS) (“pursuant to Rule 611(b)(8) trading centers would be entitled to trade at any price 
equal to or better than the least aggressive best bid or best offer, as applicable, displayed by the 
other trading center during that one-second window. For example, if the best bid price displayed 
by another trading center has flickered between $10.00 and $10.01 during the one-second 
window, the trading center that received the order could execute a trade at $10.00 without 
violating Rule 611.”). The SEC’s motivation for adopting this exception was a concern that rapid 
changes in trading center quotes would “create the impression that a quotation was traded-
through, when in fact the trade was effected nearly simultaneously with display of the 
quotation,” and that the SEC did “not believe that the benefits would justify the costs imposed on 
trading centers of attempting to implement an intermarket price priority rule at the level of sub-
second time increments.” Id. at 37,523. However, even at the time of the exception’s adoption, 
critical commentators alleged that its use would “create arbitrage opportunities for computerized 
market participants.” See Letter from Meyer S. Frucher, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, 
Philadelphia Stock Exchange, Inc., to Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary, Commission, dated January 
31, 2005 at 3, cited by Regulation NMS, 70 Fed. Reg. 37,496, 37,522 (June 29, 2005). 
711 Intermarket sweet orders are another source of outside the quote transactions, but should not 
be included in any estimate of the possibilities of latency arbitrage, given that they are 
deliberately ordered by investors. 
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this data by venue would be vital as certain ATSs are likely to be the principal suspects, if the 
one second rule is in fact exploited. 
7 Alternative Market Structures 
Several of the issues identified above arise from differences in the speed with which 
various market participants receive updated core data. A number of commentators have proposed 
changes to market structure to reduce the advantages associated with speed. We survey the most 
prominent ones in this section. 
7.1 Batched Auctions 
One of the best developed ideas for major market structure reform is Budish, Cramton, 
and Shim’s proposal to replace the current structure of continuous trading on exchanges with 
frequent batched auctions.712 All thirteen active stock exchanges presently share the same 
structure, in which displayed orders receive execution priority based on time of arrival within a 
continuous sequence. Orders are processed serially, however small the difference in their arrival 
times. 
This structure, Budish et al. suggest, bakes in opportunities for latency arbitrage. New 
information results in frequent revaluation of individual securities resulting from the revaluation 
of other instruments with which those securities’ prices are correlated. Under current market 
structure, each of these changes triggers a race to react, whether to withdraw now-stale quotes by 
liquidity providers or to “pick off” stale quotes in order to make a profit. Because the liquidity 
provider is just one among a large N of traders, and orders are processed serially in continuous 
time based on order of arrival, getting picked off becomes a pervasive fact of liquidity providers’ 
lives.713 This pervasive phenomenon has at least two pernicious consequences. First, it makes 
liquidity costlier because losses to speedier snipers acts as a kind of tax on the business of 
                                                 
712 See Eric Budish, Peter Cramton & John Shim, The High-Frequency Trading Arms Race: 
Frequent Batch Auctions as a Market Design Response, 130 Q.J. ECON. 1547, 1548 (2015) 
(hereinafter Budish et al., High-Frequency Trading Arms Race); see also Michael S. Barr, 
Howell E. Jackson & Margaret E. Tahyar, FINANCIAL REGULATION: LAW AND POLICY 547 
(2016) (discussing various proposed responses to the rise of high-frequency trading).  
713 Eric Budish, Peter Cramton & John Shim, Implementation Details for Frequent Batch 
Auctions: Slowing Down Markets to the Blink of an Eye, 104 AM. ECON. REV. 418 (2015) (a 
liquidity provider’s “request to adjust their stale quotes would have to reach the exchange before 
all of the requests to pick off their stale quotes.”). Importantly, the proposed auction involves 
“sealed-bids,” so none of the orders submitted are displayed until the auction outcome is 
reported. Id. at 419. 
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liquidity provision. Second, it triggers an arms race for speed that consumes resources in the real 
economy but has no tangible welfare consequences given the near-zero time differences at which 
modern trading occurs.714 
Their proposal is to replace continuous time trading with discrete but frequently repeated 
batched auctions, say every one millisecond. Rather than processing orders serially as they 
arrive, incoming orders would be aggregated in a uniform-price double auction. As a result, 
minute differences in speed would cease to confer a competitive advantage, heightening 
incentives for price competition.715 Essentially, they propose a “tick for time,” analogous to the 
“tick” or minimum price variation in which quoting is permitted in equity markets. 
7.2 Speed Bumps: IEX 
Perhaps the most important, and certainly the most controversial, market structure 
development of 2016 was the application of the ATS IEX to become a stock exchange. The 
application generated extensive comments, but the SEC ultimately approved it.716 While 
providing a familiar electronic limit order book structure, IEX adopted a series of innovative 
practices, some of which it will continue as an exchange. 
Most famously, as an ATS, IEX imposed a “speed bump,” largely intended to address the 
perceived problem of inter-exchange order cancelation, noted above. The speed bump applies to 
communications arriving at and departing the IEX matching engine, and it means that when an 
order arrives at IEX, IEX’s systems will wait 350 microseconds to post and/or execute it, and 
that when an execution occurs on IEX, the counterparties are only notified after a 350 
microsecond delay. Because those involved in an order do not find out about the execution for a 
delayed period of time, a large trader has sufficient time for its orders to arrive at other 
exchanges or for IEX to route the remainder of an order to other exchanges, before other market 
participants discover the IEX execution and can react. During its exchange application process, 
IEX adjusted its structure so that IEX’s own order routing technology was also subject to the 350 
                                                 
714 Budish et al., High-Frequency Trading Arms Race, supra note 712, at 1576-1608. 
715 See also SEC, Letter from Eric Budish to Brent J. Fields, Secretary (Feb. 5, 2016), 
https://www.sec.gov/comments/10-222/10222-371.pdf. 
716 SEC, In the Matter of the Application of Investors’ Exchange, LLC for Registration as a 
National Securities Exchange Findings, Opinion, and Order of the Commission, June 17, 2016, 
Release No. 34-78101, https://www.sec.gov/rules/other/2016/34-78101.pdf. 
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microsecond speed bump after the router’s exemption from the speed bump came under fierce 
attack.717  
7.3 Eliminating the NMS 
IEX’s application to become a registered exchange raised an interpretive issue under 
Regulation NMS. To qualify as a “protected” quotation that may not be traded through, the 
quotation has to be “immediately” executable.718 An essential design principle behind IEX was 
the “speed bump,” or physical delay of approximately 350 microseconds between receipt of a 
message at the point of connection and delivery to the matching engine.719 Approval of the 
application therefore required that the SEC conclude that access to IEX’s quotations is 
“immediate” despite the delay. Ultimately, it issued interpretive guidance permitting an 
intentional de minimis delay but did not provide a bright-line rule for what is de minimis.720 
Any attempt to create a new exchange based on batched auction principles would also 
require interpretive or exemptive relief. The point of a batched auction is to do away with time 
priority within the time frame of each auction, thus avoiding a microsecond-scale race to get in 
line at a particular price. The batch auction would be permissible only if the entrepreneur could 
persuade the SEC that the interval between auctions is de minimis. 
These examples illustrate a fundamental point: although the national market system was 
intended to permit competition among trading venues, Regulation NMS channels that 
competition into particular, and arguably narrow, forms. The SEC has concluded that the only 
permissible market structure (1) permits any stock to trade on any venue that wishes to trade it, 
and (2) requires that brokers route marketable orders to a venue offering the best price. 
                                                 
717 Letter from Sophia Lee, General Counsel, IEX to Brent Fields, Secretary, SEC, Re: Investors’ 
Exchange LLC Form 1 Application, Release No. 34-75925, https://www.sec.gov/comments/10-
222/10222-421.pdf (“The Router will interact with the IEX matching system over a 350 
microsecond speed-bump in the same way an independent third party broker would be subject to 
a speed bump.”). 
718 17 C.F.R. §600(b)(3), (57). 
719 See U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, In the Matter of the Application of Investors’ 
Exchange, LLC for Registration as a National Securities Exchange, Exchange Act Rel. No. 
78101, at 47-52 (June 17, 2016) 
720 The SEC staff did offer guidance that an intentional delay of one millisecond or less is 




Regulation NMS rules out any form of competition among exchanges that would concentrate 
trading in listed stocks on the listing exchange.721 Such a system could conceivably result in 
competition among entirely different types of trading platforms—some manual, some electronic, 
some continuous, some batched, some trading 24 hours a day and others during limited periods, 
and so on. It is not obvious how or why that form of competition would be less desirable than the 
current competition among fairly homogeneous linked electronic limit order books.  
A bit of history helps to explain the SEC’s adherence to its position. Prior to the 1975 
National Market System amendments, the NYSE was unapologetic in contending that the market 
functioned best when all liquidity in a particular stock was consolidated in a single location, and 
for NYSE-listed stocks that single location should be the NYSE. Its rules and procedures 
attempted to maintain its market share in trading of listed stocks. Rule 390 limited brokers’ 
ability to trade off the exchange. Specialists’ quotations and limit order books were not publicly 
disseminated. 
The SEC and Congress were united in their disagreement with the NYSE’s view. In 
particular, they were concerned that allowing the NYSE to continue doing business in the 
traditional way would impede the growth of electronic markets that could match buyers and 
sellers more rapidly and at lower cost. In their view, the markets had to be forced into a world of 
high-tech trading and competition. 
But this belief at least requires some explanation. We ordinarily assume that when the 
cost of entry into a business falls, the number of competitors will increase. In the business of 
operating trading markets, technology substantially reduced the non-regulatory costs of entry. 
The result should have been more trading platforms and more competition without the need for 
regulatory encouragement. Although the NYSE can write a rule requiring its member brokers to 
trade listed stocks exclusively on the exchange, it cannot force companies to list there if 
competing markets are better. 
The current regulatory design may lack a compelling account of the externality being 
solved. Without it, it is not clear why competition for liquidity provision in each traded stock is 
good and competition for (exclusive) listings is bad. Because liquidity attracts liquidity, one 
                                                 
721 Beny, supra note 589, at 465, argues for a listings-focused approach. Beny’s argument is to 
prohibit transactions in a firm’s shares on any venue on which that issuer has chosen not to list, 
with the ambition of moving market centers away from competition for order flow and toward 
competition for corporate listings. 
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might argue that securities trading is subject to network externalities. But while this is true of the 
trading in any given stock, there is little reason to think that it is true of listings. Technology has 
dramatically decreased the cost of creating a new electronic market, meaning that companies 
would have substantial choice among listing venues.  
The strongest argument in favor of the SEC’s stance may be empirical, not theoretical. 
The period since the implementation of the Order Handling Rules in 1997 has seen continuous 
improvement in basic measures of market quality. The U.S. equity markets perform well in 
comparison both to equity markets in other countries and in comparison to the fixed income 
markets, which are not subject to the same regulatory regime. This makes a powerful case for the 
current structure. 
A speculative counterargument is that in the 20th century, for a variety of historical 
reasons, the NYSE obtained a dominant market position. Once Congress and the SEC had 
achieved the stock market equivalent of the AT&T breakup, competition flourished and the need 
to oversee that competition at such a detailed level vanished along with the NYSE’s dominant 
position. A key question for a new special study is whether less intrusive regulations could 
provide the same competitive benefits. 
7.4 Venue Innovation 
Provided there is sufficient regulatory flexibility, innovation by trading venues is likely to 
also mean that market structure continues to evolve in sometimes dramatic ways. IEX’s 
exchange application seems to have ignited a spate of new proposals. 
For instance, Nasdaq has proposed an innovative new order type.722 Named the 
“Extended Life Priority Order Attribute,” this change would give displayed orders that commit to 
remaining on the order book for one second or more a higher priority than other displayed orders 
on Nasdaq’s limit order book.723 While not framed by Nasdaq in this way, the rule seems 
designed to address a widely shared concern about today’s market structure, which is that it 
features an excessive amount of intermediation. The worry is that professional dealers’ market 
making capabilities have in some way “crowded out” liquidity provision by “natural” end-users 
or investors interested in actually owning firms’ stock. More straightforwardly, the order type 
                                                 
722 Notice of Filing of Proposed Rule Change to Adopt a New Extended Life Priority Order 
Attribute under Rule 4703, Nov. 30, 2016, Release No. 34-79428, SR-NASDAQ-2016-161. 
723 Id. at 40.  
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would also serve to provide incentives for non-fading liquidity. Whether changes to intellectual 
property law are necessary to promote the emergence of further innovations is an open question 
worth consideration by legal scholars. 
New types of exchanges may emerge to supplement innovation at existing stock 
exchanges. For instance, there have been recent calls for something like a venture exchange in 
which listed firms could have their stock traded among a limited set of investors, free of the 
disclosure requirements federal securities law currently imposes on public corporations.724 In a 
somewhat similar vein, the exchange operator BATS has called for the concentration of liquidity 
for thinly-traded securities at the primary listing exchange for that security.725 As part of that 
ambition, BATS expressed interest in no longer offering trading on BATS in illiquid securities 
listed on other exchanges.726 Increasing pressure on how securities law currently conceives of the 
“public” corporation could have other implications for equity market structure.727 
7.5 EMSAC’s Proposed Reforms 
In early 2015, the SEC formed an Equity Market Structure Advisory Committee 
(EMSAC). Its members are tasked with studying the structure and functioning of the U.S. equity 
markets and providing advice and recommendations for market reform. The EMSAC has made a 
number of notable recommendations: 
 An Access Fee Pilot proposal that would study the effects of altering access fee 
caps on rebates, order routing, liquidity, and other market quality outcomes728  
 Reforms to liability limits of SROs, whereby rule-based liability limits are 
increased and regulatory capital potentially required. EMSAC also suggested 
                                                 
724 See A. C. Pritchard, Revisiting “Truth in Securities” Revisited: Abolishing IPOs and 
Harnessing Private Markets in the Public Good, 36 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 999 (2013). 
725 Chris Concannon, Letter to BATS Customers and Trading Community, 
http://cdn.batstrading.com/resources/newsletters/CEO-Newsletter-April-2015.pdf. 
726 Id. (arguing that “concentrating displayed liquidity in thinly-traded stocks at a single venue 
will enable market participants to more efficiently form prices, and that one venue also will be 
better able to innovate their markets specifically for thinly traded stocks (i.e., tick size, auctions, 
etc.).”). 
727 See Donald C. Langevoort & Robert B. Thompson, “Publicness” in Contemporary Securities 
Regulation After the Jobs Act, 101 GEO. L.J. 337, 339 (2013). 




reforms to the governance structure of NMS plans, involving a greater role for 
non-exchange constituents729 
 Recommendations involving volatility, including price band mechanisms to 
address flaws regarding re-openings auctions after volatility halts730 
All of these efforts would produce highly valuable data, particularly concerning the 
interaction between access fee caps, maker-taker fees, and off-exchange trade, but some may 
also increase market complexity. 
7.6 The Tick Size Pilot 
Beginning in October 2016, the SEC implemented a pilot project to adjust the tick size or 
minimum increment in which a displayed order can price a bid or ask quote for a stock.731 In the 
early 2000s, the U.S. stock market went through decimalization, or the process of reducing the 
tick size to one cent.732 Since then, some have argued that this reduced tick size has had adverse 
effects on market quality. The essential argument is that a large tick size rewards liquidity 
provision, and that because IPO underwriters often make markets in the company’s stock, 
increasing market makers’ return on liquidity provision can arguably make investment banks 
more eager to underwrite IPOs, with positive effects for capital formation and job creation.733 
This argument was influential in initiating the tick size pilot.  
                                                 




730 EMSAC, Recommendations for Rule-Making on Issues of Market Quality, Nov. 16, 2016, 
https://www.sec.gov/spotlight/emsac/emsac-market-quality-subcommittee-final-
recommendations-1116.pdf. 
731 FINRA, Tick Size Pilot Program, http://www.finra.org/industry/tick-size-pilot-program 
(providing extensive details on rationale and function of pilot). 
732 Decimalization was codified in Rule 612 of Reg. NMS. See 17 C.F.R. §242.612 (“No national 
securities exchange, national securities association, alternative trading system, vendor, or broker 
or dealer shall display, rank, or accept from any person a bid or offer, an order, or an indication 
of interest in any NMS stock priced in an increment smaller than $0.01 if that bid or offer, order, 
or indication of interest is priced equal to or greater than $1.00 per share.”). 
733 See, e.g., David Weild, Edward Kim & Lisa Newport, The Trouble with Small Tick Sizes: 
Larger Tick Sizes will Bring Back Capital Formation, Jobs and Investor Confidence, Grant 
Thorton Capital Markets Series (Sept. 2012). 
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The pilot program, which spans two years, involves a control group and three test groups, 
each consisting of around 400 small capitalization issuers, and will allow for a five-cent tick size 
for those issuers’ securities. During the pilot, the SEC will gather and make available market 
quality data in order to test whether a widening tick size for small capitalization companies 
improves or harms liquidity, volume, and market quality. While the tick size will produce  
market data for research purposes, various critics, including the SEC’s Investor Advisory 
Committee, argue that increasing the tick size will harm investors.734 They contend that in the 
past, market making has increased even as the tick size decreased; a larger tick size means 
costlier liquidity for the smallest investors for whom the spread is a good measure of liquidity; 
and the current spread represents the efficient equilibrium of a competitive market.735 Indeed, 
one might argue that the tick size should be made smaller for actively-traded, large capitalization 
stocks that typically trade with a one-penny spread. Critics also point out that underwriters are 
typically no longer actively involved in market making. 
8 Conclusion and Implications for Future Research 
Equity trading markets changed dramatically in the past two decades, while the 
regulatory architecture has undergone far less updating. Considering which aspects of that 
architecture should be revised, and if so how, constitutes the foundation of a future research 
agenda for those invested in the regulation of trading markets. As a starting point for this 
research, we conclude by summarizing major pressure points placed on the current regulatory 
system. 
First, there are a series of overlapping concerns about the current categorization system 
for trading venues as well as the structure of SROs and status of exchanges. Should there be 
multiple different regulatory statuses for trading venues that are becoming increasingly 
functionally similar? Should exchanges remain individual SROs with the absolute immunity 
from private suit that accompanies that status? Should the exchanges retain their low rule-book 
liability limits? 
                                                 
734 Recommendation of the Investor Advisory Committee Decimalization and Tick Sizes, 
https://www.sec.gov/-spotlight/investor-advisory-committee-2012/investment-adviser-
decimilization-recommendation.pdf. 
735 Id. at 7-9. 
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Second, the current system relies heavily on broker-dealers as gatekeepers. Accordingly, 
the regulatory system should be attentive to whether competition sufficiently mediates the 
conflicting interests of broker-dealers and their customers. Areas for particular study include 
monetary inducements in the form of maker/taker fees or payment for order flow. 
Third, there are significant drawbacks to the predominantly common law approach to 
trader misconduct on which the SEC and Department of Justice currently rely. Insider trading 
law may have more coherency than some commentators appreciate, but significant uncertainties 
remain under current law regarding important issues. Manipulation law is the subject of 
considerable disagreement among the federal circuit courts on foundational questions. Section 
9(a)(2) of the Exchange Act, because of the very limited case law addressing it, may offer courts 
and regulators a fresh start for conceptualizing and prosecuting manipulation. Both the law of 
insider trading and of manipulation might also benefit from well-crafted statutory enactments 
defining their precise contours. 
Fourth, important open empirical questions could have a significant impact on policy if 
answered in specific ways. For instance, the conceptual case for the negative externality imposed 
on lit liquidity by dark liquidity is plausible, but its actual economic significance is unknown. 
Using data from IEX’s transition to an exchange, or from an SEC-mandated experiment, 
empiricists should study whether increased dark liquidity has a negative effect on the lit market 

































Table 4:   Routing venues and routing decisions for an introducing broker for NYSE-listed 
stocks 
 
Route Venue Total % Market % Limit % Other % 
Citadel Execution Services 28.19 35.87 9.12 32.71 
KCG Americas LLC 20.79 30.46 5.47 22.79 
NASDAQ 15.89 0.00 47.66 9.81 
G1 Execution Services 11.07 15.99 2.90 12.26 
BATS (EDGX) 11.02 0.00 31.69 7.38 
Two Sigma Securities 7.33 4.64 0.88 11.31 
UBS Securities LLC 3.74 6.50 1.16 3.55 
Total % 100.00 24.58 22.45 52.97 
          
 
Source:  Scottrade, Inc., SEC Rule 606 Report, 1st Quarter 2017. 
 
 
 
